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FOLLOWING A SIGMOID PROGRESSION:
SOME JURISPRUDENTIAL AND PRAGMATIC
CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING
TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION AMONG
NATION-STATES
John C. Duncan, Jr.*
Abstract: This article analyzes methods and doctrines used by States to acquire territories. The role of the United Nations in resolving disputes between nations and the inhabitants directly affected by the disputes is also
addressed, including the jurisdictional, jurisprudential, and practical considerations of territorial acquisition. Finally, traditional territorial acquisition doctrines are applied to extraterrestrial and outer space acquisition.
As Western civilization etched out territories and borders across its known
world, international norms of diplomatic behavior appeared in the form
of customs. These customs eventually grew into codifications, which in
turn grew into the elaborate international system enjoyed and protested
today. Laws emerged among international States to formalize the growing
body of norms of interaction across them. Modern territorial sovereignty
provides the State an “exclusive right” to perform State functions within
that territory, but with a realization that no State may exercise its authority
within the territorial limits of other States.

Introduction
Before lands were “possessed” and nation-states emerged, there was
territory. For millennia, people have organized themselves into groups,
tribes, and nations for community-level protection, kinship, and com-
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mon identity.1 The laws that emerged in these high-context social structures codified the accepted, informal standards of interaction.2 National
boundaries, a relatively recent innovation in human history, characterize the nation-state and organize the world as we know it; they are purely
symbolic but strict limits on identity and connection to higher-order social groups.3 Indeed, as fields of social regulation, both international
relations and international law depend heavily on specific definitions in
order to function in arenas of ambiguity and fluid inference.4
As Western civilization etched territories and borders across the
known world, international norms of diplomatic behavior appeared in
the form of customs.5 These customs were eventually codified and grew
into the elaborate international system we know today.6 Eventually, laws
emerged within societies to formalize this growing body of norms of
international interaction.7 In the fourteenth century BC, for example,
treaties between Egypt and its neighbors reveal that even hundreds of
years ago principles of mutual sovereignty and equality among political
entities were firmly entrenched.8 The Greeks developed a similarly
complex system of international laws to regulate interactions among
their city-states.9
International rules of territorial acquisition, in their modern form,
are largely a product of the last five centuries.10 This history suggests
their peculiarly European origins; indeed, modern international law of
territorial acquisition is almost exclusively a product of Western civilization, rather than an equitable interaction among all civilizations.11 To
be sure, the concept of diplomatic immunity was influenced by Islamic
civilizations and the practices of the Ottoman empire, but this influ1 John Maxcy Zane, The Story of Law 22 (1927). This book provides a fascinating
in-depth look into the origins and evolution of legal development.
2 See id. at 24.
3 See I.A. Shearer, Starke’s International Law 172 (11th ed. 1994).
4 See M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in
International Law 19 (1926).
5 Zane, supra note 1, at 418.
6 See id. at 419.
7 See id. at 24.
8 Charles G. Fenwick, International Law 5 (4th ed. 1965).
9 Id. at 9.
10 Shearer, supra note 3, at 7–8.
11 Id. at 7–9. For a comprehensive discussion and categorization of the world’s civilizations, see generally 1 Arnold J. Toynbee, A Study of History 51–128 (2d ed. 5th impression 1951). For a formulation of Toynbee’s categories within the context of international
relations per se, as well as a very insightful update to Toynbee’s categories to conform to the
modern day, see generally Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, Foreign Aff.,
Summer 1993, at 22.
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ence registered relatively late in the evolution of established European
rules of international conflict avoidance that formed during the periods of most European expansion.12
Encounters between Europeans and the indigenous societies of
the Americas did not immediately create the basis for determining the
rules of intercivilizational interaction, but rather clarified for Europeans the need to establish rules for minimizing conflict among European Powers.13 The European Powers thus adopted rationales that
served their interests without regard for the rights or well-being of the
indigenous societies that already occupied lands “discovered” by European explorers.14 The Europeans’ insistence on adopting universal
rules of international interaction is therefore significant; it reflects a
departure from the earlier practice of extending hegemony over foreign peoples.15 This motivation to build universal rules of international
law prevailed in international relations far beyond those rules’ immediate utility in managing relations among European powers.16 In this regard, the Europeans’ strong desire to formulate universal rules—rather
than those that simply served national interests—is remarkable.17 In
later centuries, this logic was extended to practices of members of the
world community, at times to the detriment of members of Western
civilization who would have preferred to forego hegemonic interests
altogether rather than to flout the objective of universal rules of international interaction.18
Self-serving rules from the era of post-Renaissance European hegemonic expansion grew into tenets of international law that exist today.19 Even so, parties to modern discussions of international law fail to
recognize the fact that international law is a product of European civilization’s unique perceptions of the “natural” order of the world, instead
clinging to the notion that universality is inherent in rules of international interaction.20 Ultimately, modern international law is the outgrowth of an unwavering adherence among the Western European
powers to the purported universality of the rules they adopted to fore12 See Sharon Korman, The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by
Force in International Law and Practice 34 (1996).
13 See id. at 45.
14 See id. at 46.
15 See Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law 23–24 (6th ed. 2008).
16 See id.
17 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id. at 13–14.
20 See id. at 39.
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stall conflict among themselves as they pursued their respective hegemonic ambitions.21 To be sure, had such rules of international law preserved those tenets that were fundamentally generalizable only to European powers—for example, the Papal differentiation between Christian
peoples and all others—there would be no perceptions of universality in
international law today.22 In the present era, the United Nations (U.N.)—
a product of conflicts primarily within and affecting Western civilization—evidences the commonly accepted concepts of equality of States,
particularly in light of the legacy of the League of Nations.23 Although
the notion of “sovereignty” generates much debate, this Article addresses the term only with regard to territorial acquisition, with an eye
to emphasizing the prominent role of Western civilization in establishing the rules of international law that dominate the world today.24
Although early civilizations were less conscious of territorial
boundaries than of common identity, the necessity to hold territory
and defend it against threats inevitably led to defined territories established according to the nation-state formula familiar in modern
times.25 To be sure, it is an observable fact that civilizations tend to try
to extend their boundaries as far as possible.26 Under these conditions,
civilizational expansion originally involved the seizure of territory without regard to whether the territory already belonged to indigenous societies.27 Nevertheless, norms that now guide international behavior
began as norms to guide intercivilizational behavior, namely between
the Egyptian civilization and its Sumeric and Babylonic neighbors.28
Territorial sovereignty grants the State an exclusive right of authority and control within that territory.29 The corollary is that no State has
any right to exercise its authority within the territory of any other
State.30 Implicit in this definition is the principle that the limits of a
State’s duties and privileges correspond to the geographic boundaries
21 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 13–14.
22 See id. at 39.
23 See id. at 30–31.
24 See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International
Law 17–18 (7th ed. 1997). Throughout the past century, international political cooperation has placed some restrictions upon a State’s sovereignty, as States have become less
autonomous than they were in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. See Shearer,
supra note 3, at 90.
25 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 147–153.
26 See id.
27 Id.
28 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 5.
29 Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928).
30 Id.
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of its territory.31 A State’s territory includes the land itself and all that
exists above and below it.32 In addition, a State’s territory includes as
much as twelve miles of sea extending from any coastal border.33
The Island of Palmas arbitration provides exceptional insight into
the role of ancient doctrines in international territorial governance
and possession.34 The arbitration involved a dispute between the Netherlands and the United States, both of which claimed sovereignty over
the Island of Palmas.35 The United States acquired the island from
Spain, which claimed title dating back to 1648 under the doctrine of
discovery.36 Nevertheless, the Netherlands claimed title via active possession and the effective exercise of sovereign rights over a sufficient
time to evoke contest.37 The dispute was heard by the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, which held that the island belonged to the Netherlands.38 The resolution of this dispute placed the burden of contest on
any State seeking to claim territory actively possessed by another
State.39 Following the passage of a sufficiently reasonable time period, a
failure to contest constitutes acquiescence to possession by the sovereign that actively controls the disputed territory.40
From its origins in early civilizations, territorial acquisition has
evolved through the millennia from relying primarily on the use of
brute force to dominate weaker powers to an idealized concept of selfdetermination and peaceful transfers that eschews conquest and the
use of force to acquire territory.41 This Article reviews the manner of
territorial acquisition in the twenty-first century, focusing on the devel31 See Shearer, supra note 3, at 90. As Shearer states, “[t]he basic rights most frequently
stressed have been those of the independence and equality of states, of territorial jurisdiction and of self-defense and self-preservation.” Id. These rights contrast with several duties
imposed upon a State, including: avoiding war, completing treaty obligations, and “not
intervening in the affairs of other states.” Id.
32 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 76.
33 Id.
34 See Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 835.
35 See id. at 831.
36 Id. at 837.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 871.
39 See id. at 870.
40 See Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 868.
41 Morton H. Halperin & David J. Scheffer, Self-Determination in the New
World Order 16–17 (1992). There are two different concepts of self-determination. Id. at
16. The first— “external self-determination” —provides “that people have the right to
choose their own sovereignty—that is, to be free from external coercion or alien domination.” Id. The second concept simply requires that people have a meaningful role in the
political process. Id. at 17.
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opment of various means of acquisition.42 Beginning with methods developed millennia ago, this Article charts the shifts in international policies and socially acceptable standards of territorial acquisition in modern times, particularly as they are relevant to the role of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the settlement of international
disputes over territory.43
The European discovery of the Americas in 1492 fueled the formation of international standards of acquisition.44 European States quickly
attempted to establish themselves in this new, mostly open expanse.45
Partly as a result of the power struggle prompted by the discovery of the
vast natural resources available on the new continent, European States
developed mutually recognizable standards for the acquisition of territory.46 By establishing a pattern of reciprocal benefits, these international rules naturally worked to the advantage of European States
alone.47 Avoiding conflict among European States enabled each to better
exploit the new lands in the Western Hemisphere.48 As long as they abided by the standards established under the newly emergent doctrine of
discovery, each State could devote its efforts to conquering and colonizing territories without undue concern about interference from other,
equally powerful States.49 These standards persisted and generally remained the primary methods for acquiring territory until World War
II.50
The motive to possess and maintain territory depends on the perspective of the would-be possessor. Whereas States have significant interests in maintaining territorial integrity,51 the interests of international governing bodies are geared more to preserving stability and
equality.52 As a result of the modern standards of territorial acquisi42 See discussion infra Parts I, III.
43 See discussion infra Part I.
44 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 27–28 (discussing commissions bestowed on European
discoverers as “good evidence of the fact that Conquest or Cession was regarded as the
normal method of acquiring territory already in the possession of native tribes”).
45 See id.
46 Korman, supra note 12, at 47–48.
47 See id.
48 See id. By working together, the Europeans, through the doctrine of discovery, were
able both to reduce the costs of such acquisitions by not fighting with each other, and further to ease their expansion by effectively creating an oligopsony over terra nullius in the
Americas. See id. at 42–44.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 135–36.
51 Shearer, supra note 3, at 90.
52 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1 (indicating that one purpose of the U.N. is “to maintain
international peace and security . . . .”).
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tion—which have become, for the most part, internationally accepted
norms of behavior for States—individual States’ ability to acquire new
territory is limited.53 Modern standards, at least since the great wars of
the twentieth century, focus primarily on questions of human rights
and international treaties to determine territorial title and have done
away with the archaic doctrines of conquest and discovery.54
Yet, conflicts continue to arise and territories continue to shift from
State to State.55 There are several motivations for unilateral deviations
from international norms, including ethnocultural, religiophilosophical, and even merely geographic differences, which strain the integrity
of traditional borders at various times under the continually evolving
social conditions of the planet’s complex infrastructure of human habitation and interest.56 Self-determination, the central principle of modern acquisition, provides that certain peoples should have a say in the
creation of their own governments.57 Modern examples of the exercise
of self-determination abound. For example, Palestinians have obtained
recognition from a majority of the world’s States;58 factions within Québec continue to militate for secession from Canada;59 the people of Darfur demand autonomy from Sudan;60 and Puerto Rico’s independentistas
continue to advocate peacefully for the island’s independence from the
United States.61 Before considering the relative legitimacy of each peo53 See David Webster, Warfare and the Evolution of the State: A Reconsideration, 40 Am. Antiquity 464, 465 (1975).
54 See Korman, supra note 12, at 133.
55 See Lea Brilmayer, Essay, Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial Interpretation, 16
Yale J. Int’l L. 177, 177 (1991) (noting several modern-day secessionist movements that
have attempted to redraw political boundaries and create internationally recognized
States).
56 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 157, 338. In discussing territorial disputes,
Malanczuk notes that “legal and political arguments are often used side-by-side. . . . The
main political arguments which are used in territorial disputes are the principles of geographical contiguity, of historical contiguity and of self-determination.” Id. at 157. Additionally, “[t]he problems of minorities and of the special category of indigenous peoples
. . . have led to a vivid discussion as to whether such groups have a right to selfdetermination or whether a new definition of self-determination is required to accommodate extreme situations.” Id. at 338.
57 See Brilmayer, supra note 56, at 177.
58 See John Cerone, The UN and the Status of Palestine—Disentangling the Legal Issue, Am.
Soc’y Int’l L. Insights (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.asil.org/insights110913.cfm.
59 See Anthony DePalma, Canadian Court Rules Quebec Cannot Secede on Its Own, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 21, 1998, at A1.
60 Jeffrey Gettleman, Sudan Steps Up Furious Drive to Stop Rebels, N.Y. Times, June 21, 2011,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/world/africa/21sudan.html.
61 Jason Adolfo Otano, Note, Puerto Rico Pandemonium: The Commonwealth Constitution
and the Compact-Colony Conundrum, 27 Fordham Int’l L.J. 1806, 1806 (2004).
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ple’s claims, however, it is essential to understand the methods of territorial acquisition that have evolved from ancient origins.
Part I addresses the legacy methods used by States in acquiring
territory under traditional doctrines of occupation, prescription, cession, and conquest. Part II discusses contemporary issues regarding territorial acquisition, including self-determination and specific international agreements through efforts by the League of Nations and the
United Nations. Part III address contemporary jurisprudential and
pragmatic considerations for territorial acquisition under the principles
of self-determination and self-defense, the doctrine of uti possidetis, and
methods for territorial dispute resolution. Finally, this article concludes
with future considerations for territorial acquisition, including acquisitions of extraterrestrial land and outer space.
I. The Legacy of Past Methods of Acquisition
As Lassa Oppenheim has written, “because the new law has developed out of the old . . . the old is necessary to an understanding of the
new.”62 A basic appreciation of the legacy modes of acquisition is necessary to understand the geocentric, modern-day justifications for territorial acquisition. Moreover, despite international regulation, many of the
ancient methods of acquisition remain.63 Although newer, more humane methods may supplant the now-antiquated legacy modes of acquisition, twenty-first century modes of acquisition still reflect aspects of
the archaic models.64
Throughout the millennia, the most powerful States have sought
to expand their empires by seizing new land.65 Such takings were more
than a simple acquisition of property; rather, when a State laid claim to
additional increments of territorial jurisdiction, it imposed “a right of
political control, of ultimate authority,” as opposed to a “right of property.”66 As international codes of conduct have developed over the past
five centuries, European States—and, more recently, States across all
civilizations—began cooperating to identify ways to agree upon the establishment of title to lands in a manner that worked to the mutual
62 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 70, § 242.
63 See Korman, supra note 12, at 250–55.
64 See discussion infra Part III.
65 See generally Barry A. Weinstein, Boundaries and Security in International Law and State
Practice, 3 Finnish Y.B. Int’l L. 135 (1992) (discussing trends of territorial acquisition by
powerful groups throughout history, starting with early nomadic tribes and continuing
through the Soviet Union in the mid-twentieth century).
66 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 403 (emphasis added).
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benefit of those parties affected by each such case.67 The concept of
title in this Article thus describes the legal claim to territory by a State.68
As these customs evolved, five doctrines of acquisition developed:69 the
doctrines of occupation; prescription; cession; accretion (or accession);70 and conquest.71 To be sure, this categorical approach often
oversimplifies the complexities of territorial acquisition and tends to
obscure the reality of political cross-purposes that have generated most

67 See id.
68 See id.
69 Seokwoo Lee, Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in International Law and a Modest Proposal, 16 Conn. J. Int’l L. 1, 2 (2000). Lee’s paper is an
interesting and base analysis of the utilization of legacy modes of acquisition. See id. The
paper also discusses uti possidetis and self-determination, and their potential application to
modern international law. See id. at 11. Touching upon many of the same issues as this
Article, Lee provides similar, yet alternative, views on territorial acquisition over time. See
id. at 2.
70 Although accretion is beyond the scope of this Article, it is useful to understand the
basic doctrine. Accretion describes a geographical process where new land attaches to
existing land. Shaw, supra note 15, at 498. New formations may be naturally occurring or
artificial. 1 Oppenheim’s International Law § 258 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds.,
9th ed. 1992). Examples of natural accretion include land formed at river deltas, other
newly formed islands and river beds that remain after water ceases to flow. Id. §§ 260–262.
Examples of artificial accretion include “embankments, breakwaters, dykes, and the like
. . . .” Id. § 259.
In Nebraska v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court applied the doctrine of accretion (and its
sister doctrine of avulsion) to settle a border dispute between two states:
It is settled law that when grants of land border on running water, and the
banks are changed by that gradual process known as “accretion,” the riparian
owner’s boundary line still remains the stream, although, during the years, by
this accretion, the actual area of his possessions may vary. . . .
It is equally well settled, that where a stream, which is a boundary, from
any cause suddenly abandons its old and seeks a new bed, such change of
channel works no change of boundary; and that the boundary remains as it
was, in the center of the old channel, although no water may be flowing
therein. This sudden and rapid change of channel is termed, in the law,
“avulsion.” . . .
These propositions, which are universally recognized as correct where the
boundaries of private property touch on streams, are in like manner recognized where the boundaries between States or nations are, by prescription or
treaty, found in running water. Accretion, no matter to which side it adds
ground, leaves the boundary still the center of the channel. Avulsion has no
effect on boundary, but leaves it in the center of the old channel. . . .
....
Such is the received rule of the law of nations on this point, as laid down
by all the writers of authority.
143 U.S. 359, 360–62 (1982) (internal quotations omitted).
71 See Seokwoo, supra note 69, at 2.
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significant territorial conflicts over the past five centuries.72 Moreover,
some traditional modes of acquisition are archaic by today’s standards
and are unlikely to emerge as justifications for future title acquisitions.73 In fact, judicial proceedings in both international and national
courts tend to identify more than one mode of acquisition, and different categories of justification rarely reinforce one another; instead, they
tend to generate vexingly conflicting conclusions in each case.74 In order to ascertain title, and thus recommend granting it to a single party,
it is necessary for a tribunal to disentangle all of the categories and determine which category governs the facts.75 Hence, in the present discussion, some cases arise in multiple sections, and a discussion of each
category of acquisition is necessary for a full understanding of the implications of each case.76 Moreover, an understanding of traditional
categories provides a useful basis for discussing modern acquisitions.
A. The Doctrine of Occupation
For practical purposes, the doctrine of occupation depends intimately on the doctrine of discovery.77 Occupation requires settlement
of non-appropriated territory by a State, with the intent of incorporating the territory into the national domain and exercising sovereignty
over it.78 Although European powers permitted simple discovery by
other European States into the eighteenth century, title claims eventually required occupation of discovered lands.79 States often manifested
occupation by installing a defensible fort on the land to demonstrate
their ability to safeguard the land from indigenous societies and foreign

72 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 127 (6th ed. 2003).
73 See id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 See id.
77 Cf. Lindsay G. Robertson, Conquest by Law: How the Discovery of America
Dispossessed Indigenous Peoples of Their Lands 127–37 (2005) (discussing how the
U.S. Supreme Court wrestled with reconciling the doctrines of discovery and occupation
through disputes regarding Native American title to land). From the discovery of previously unknown territories came significant rights to title, including rights of occupation.
See Shaw, supra note 15, at 504.
78 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 405.
79 Id. at 404–05.
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invaders.80 Simply planting the State’s flag on the unoccupied land,
however, could suffice to effectuate occupation.81
This doctrine has become an obsolete form of territorial acquisition82 for the simple reason that no habitable land remains open for
possible occupation or discovery.83 While searching for a new route to
India, Christopher Columbus “discovered” —at least, from a European
perspective—the Americas, and the doctrines of discovery and occupation emerged as integral parts of exploration and acquisition.84 The
original theory of discovery as a justification for territorial acquisition
depended on a civilization-centric theory of information.85 That is, the
question of prior habitation depended on information available to
members of Western civilization—namely, the European powers.86 In
the hands of a non-Western civilization—such as the Islamic, Sinic, or
Far Eastern87—such information did nothing to influence European
perceptions on the matter of this important tenet of international
law.88 An alternative expression of this fact is that, at the time, international law was fundamentally European law—and, indeed, only Western
European law.89 If a non-European power ultimately adopted the same
theory, it could by such means gain legitimacy vis-à-vis the Europeans
and possibly benefit in terms of its own quests for territorial expansion.90 For example, the Russian Empire—categorized by Arnold J.
Toynbee as part of the Orthodox civilization distinct from Western civilization91—eventually adopted this theory.92 Despite its obsolescence,

80 Id. at 252.
81 Shaw, supra note 15, at 504. Discoverers initially claimed monumentally broad
swaths of land on behalf of their nations, as, for example, when Cabot claimed the entirety
of North America by sighting it from a ship in 1497. Lindley, supra note 4, at 130.
82 R.Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law 20 (1963).
83 See id.
84 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 404 (“Occupation as a title to territory obtained its important place in international law in connection with the claims of existing European
states to acquisitions of territory in the New World opened up by explorers after the discovery of the American continent in the fifteenth century . . . .”).
85 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 20.
86 See id.
87 See 1 Toynbee, supra note 11, at 129 (listing these three civilizations, among others,
as non-Western).
88 See Korman, supra note 12, at 45.
89 See id.
90 See id. at 65.
91 See id.; see 1 Toynbee, supra note 11, at 133.
92 Id.
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an understanding of the doctrine of occupation is crucial to the modern resolution of territorial disputes.93
1. Colonization and the Doctrine of Occupation
a. The Americas
The European discovery of the Americas in the late fifteenth century presented novel challenges to the European powers’ pursuit of
territorial acquisition that would minimize conflicts with other European powers.94 The enduring legacy of the boundaries drawn during
the original European occupation of the Americas has had an enormous effect on the identity and geography of the resulting States due to
the use by the former colonies of the doctrine of uti possidetis to formalize their boundaries upon independence.95 In many cases in the
Americas, the European powers relied on the doctrine of conquest to
acquire new territory and assert authority over indigenous societies;
however, conquest alone was insufficient to establish title to the lands.96
The doctrine of discovery permitted Europeans to take control of
land in the Americas by giving “title to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession.”97 If a
93 See Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 (Austl.). In Mabo (No. 2), the High
Court of Australia faced the question of occupation in determining aboriginal rights to the
Murray Islands, a dispute with origins dating back to Great Britain’s first colonization of Australia. See id. at 20, 75. The United States may face a similar issue regarding title to the North
Pole; while such possibility is rare, recent developments involving Russia could lead the United States to claim sovereignty over the North Pole based on the doctrine of discovery. See
Luke Harding, Kremlin Lays Claim to Huge Chunk of Oil-Rich North Pole, Guardian (U.K.)
( June 18, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/28/russia.oil; Press Release,
Comm’n on Limits of the Cont’l Shelf, Russian Federation First to Move to Establish Outer
Limits of its Extended Continental Shelf, U.N. Press Release SEA/1729 (Dec. 21, 2001),
available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sea1729.doc.htm. Unfortunately, as
of the time of this writing, the matter is still in early stages of development, and as such, credible information is somewhat sparse.
94 Randall Lesaffer, Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation
and Acquisitive Prescription, 16 Eur. J. Int’l L. 25, 41–42 (2005).
95 John Duncan, Uti Possidetis: Is Possession Really Nine-Tenths of the Law? The Acquisition of
Territory by the United States: Why, How, and Should We? 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 513, 515–18
(2007). Uti possidetis (“so you possessed”) is interpreted in the present-perfect tense in English (“so you have possessed”) and implies uti possidetis (“so you shall [continue to] possess”).
Id. at 516. The doctrine suggests that “administrative boundaries will become international
boundaries when a political subdivision or colony achieves independence.” Black’s Law
Dictionary 1686 (9th ed. 2009).
96 Korman, supra note 12, at 44.
97 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823).
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European State discovered terra nullius, that State had a claim to the
territory against all other European States and could take title to the
land by way of the doctrine of occupation.98 “It was a right which all
[European States] asserted for themselves, and to the assertion of
which, by others, all assented.”99 Hence, title could be established upon
discovery by building some form of settlement in the territory.100
After the European discovery of the Americas, Papal grants and
the doctrine of discovery were the initial means of providing rights of
acquisition for terra nullius, or “no man’s land.”101 Terra nullius is land
that is, at least in theory, not possessed by another State.102 To the European powers, it referred generally to land free from the possession of
other European powers.103 In 1492, the Pope granted the right to conquer the Western Hemisphere to Portugal and Spain, defining for each
State a general area of dominion.104 Under the authority of the Donation of Constantine, the Pope claimed the power to establish for Christian rulers the right to acquire territory from and rule over the “heathens and infidels” that sparsely populated the Western Hemisphere.105
Many resisted this Papal power, however; indeed, several European
States ignored the grants of territory and made forays into new continents despite of the Papal edicts.106 Eventually, the doctrine of discovery developed to regulate the problems with Papal grants.107
The ability to claim land through simple discovery quickly led to a
proliferation of claims by mere sightings from marine vessels.108 To address this potential issue, beginning in the eighteenth century European
States refused to recognize title by discovery alone.109 European leaders
realized that to continue to avoid mutual conflict, it would be necessary
98 See id.
99 Id.
100 Lindley, supra note 4, at 141.
101 Id. at 124–25.
102 Korman, supra note 12, at 43.
103 Id.
104 Lindley, supra note 4, at 124–26.
105 Id. at 124.
106 Id. at 126–28; Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 42. Certain European powers and indigenous societies in the newly discovered territories did not concur with the European concepts of terra nullius. See Lindley, supra note 4, at 127; Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 42. Indeed, the Incan response to these Papal grants was “that the Pope must be crazy to talk of
giving away countries which do not belong to him.” Lindley, supra note 4, at 127 (internal
quotations omitted).
107 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 129–30.
108 See id. at 130–31.
109 See id. at 132.
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to condition title on something more than a mere sighting by sea.110
Accordingly, occupation became a requirement for a legitimate claim of
title.111 The doctrine of discovery remained important, though: discovery of terra nullius permitted a State to claim temporary title, adverse to
other States, until it was feasible to establish occupation.112
The guiding requirement for recognition of occupation was that
there be “sufficient governmental control to afford security to life and
property.”113 In the early days of European colonization, this often required building a defensible fort, but as the period continued, more was
necessary.114 Often, acquisition by occupation was possible only if the
occupying power built and maintained a colony.115 Once the territory
was sufficiently occupied, it fell under the sovereignty of the occupying
power, and claims by other European States were barred thereafter.116
b. Africa
Drawing from their experiences in colonizing the Americas, the
European powers applied the same doctrines of acquisition to the colonization of Africa.117 The Final Act of the Berlin Conference formalized
the doctrines of acquisition.118 However, the Final Act bound only the
parties to the agreement and applied only to new cases of occupation on
the coasts of Africa.119 The Final Act enumerated three criteria for effectuating title by way of the doctrine of occupation: (1) furnishing notice
to interested powers, (2) physical possession of the territory, and (3) establishment of a government sufficient to protect the rights of citizensubjects.120 The third criterion required the signatory States to establish
authorities to ensure the freedom of trade and transit.121 As in the
110 See id.
111 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 404.
112 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 149. The permitted grace period before the necessity for occupation varied depending upon the circumstances. See Fenwick, supra note
8, at 406–05. International tribunals also adjudged the necessary degree of occupation on
a case-by-case basis. See id. Given the practical concerns that arise from acquiring territory
across the Atlantic, a long grace period was a manifest requirement. See id.
113 Lindley, supra note 4, at 141.
114 Id. at 140.
115 Id. at 141.
116 Id. at 129–30.
117 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 255.
118 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 144.
119 Id. at 145.
120 Id. at 144, 147. The rights protected by the Final Act appear to be those already
possessed by private individuals, as well as the rights of governments. Id. at 147.
121 Id. at 144.

2012]

The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition

15

Americas, international law permitted a period of time between the original discovery and the establishment of effective occupation.122 When
necessary, reliance on the doctrine of cession—as opposed to the doctrine of conquest commonly invoked during the colonization of the
Americas—often effectuated the transfer of title from indigenous societies.123 Acquisitions under the doctrine of cession involved the transfer of
territory by treaty.124 Eventually, the doctrine of occupation, as the European powers came to understand it, extended beyond the coastal regions
and governed the acquisition of territory in the African interior.125
c. Greenland
As recently as 1933, acquisition by occupation played an important
role in determining sovereignty over a portion of Greenland.126 In Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), the court determined that the degree of occupation necessary to exercise a claim of title over any land was
122 Id.
123 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 166–68 (discussing instances in which territory was
formally ceded to European States through international agreements). The cessions utilized in Africa were often “protectorates,” which placed a region under the protection of a
powerful State. See id. at 183. There were two types of protectorates. The first permitted the
internal workings of a region to remain largely intact. See id. at 181. This structure often
served to advance a territory toward self-determination when it was at an advanced state of
development. Cf. id. (noting that the Ionian Islands adopted its own constitution while in a
protectorate arrangement with Great Britain). The second system was a colonial protectorate, in which the protecting State assumed all or part of the territory’s sovereignty. Id. at
182. The crucial difference between the two is that, under the first system, the protecting
State had no intention of incorporating the protectorate into its own government, whereas
in the colonial protectorate (as the name suggests), the intention was eventually to incorporate the protected State, or at least wield a significant amount of control. See id. at 182–
83. Along the African coast, this system was crucial for Europeans wanting to expand into
Africa in cases where the Europeans could not effectively acquire a region via occupation.
See id. at 183–86 (examining various protectorate arrangements between European States
and rulers in African coastal regions).
124 See id. at 166.
125 See id. at 148. In a dispute between Portugal and Great Britain over the centralAfrican countries of Angola and Mozambique, Lord Salisbury expressly stated his view that
the Berlin Conference did not change any of the principles of occupation in the interior
lands. Id. at 151. Portugal argued that the conference did not make an actual occupation
in interior African territories necessary, relying instead on the “spheres of influence” established as an outgrowth of the protectorate treaties. See id. Spheres of influence were
agreements between States that permitted a State to claim and then occupy land. See id. at
207. Japan similarly employed spheres of influence to exercise control over Asia; for example, agreements in 1898 and 1902 with Russia and various Western States, respectively,
recognized Japan’s special interest in Korea. Id. at 218.
126 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No.
53, at 22 (Apr. 5).
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measured by whether a State exerted “effective authority” over the disputed territory.127 In the case, Norway claimed title based on the doctrine discovery, arguing that the territory at issue was terra nullius because Denmark refrained from establishing manifest occupation, and
enunciating its intent to occupy.128 Denmark objected, claiming that
the reason it refrained from colonizing the land was that the nature of
the terrain itself prevented colonization.129 It claimed that it had indeed exercised sovereignty by way of continuous, peaceful, and undisputed protective authority over the land:130 Denmark had explored the
coasts, established a trading settlement, and mentioned its ownership
of Greenland in treaties with Norway.131 On the basis of these contacts,
Denmark proved effective authority and convinced the PCIJ to rule in
its favor, thereby defeating Norway’s claim of terra nullius.132
2. Rights of Indigenous Peoples Under the Doctrine of Occupation
A necessary facet of the doctrine of occupation is the discovery of
uninhabited terra nullius.133 The concept of terra nullius, however, was
veritably a legal fiction.134 Specifically, terra nullius reflected only the
Europeans’ perception of “no man’s land.”135 Indeed, a great number
of indigenous residents often occupied the lands purportedly “discovered” by the European powers.136 History shows that the presence of
indigenous peoples failed to dissuade the European powers from staking claims to these lands as terra nullius.137 To prevail on a claim of discovery and occupation of terra nullius, disputants fashioned creative
arguments to distinguish terra nullius from occupied areas, and thereby
to determine the rights of indigenous societies.138
127 See id. at 75.
128 Id. at 44.
129 See id. at 49.
130 Id. at 44–45.
131 Id. at 33, 44.
132 See Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, 1933 P.C.I.J. at 71–72.
133 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 2.
134 See Mabo (No.2) (1992) 175 CLR at 40–42.
135 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 18, 20.
136 See id. at 24–44 (examining the practices of States seeking to occupy alreadyinhabited lands).
137 See id. at 26, 34.
138 See generally Robertson, supra note 77 (offering a comprehensive analysis of the
European discovery and occupation of the United States and early interpretations of the
rights of Native Americans by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court, and various U.S.
States). In his study of the facts surrounding Johnson v. M’Intosh, Robertson paints a detailed picture of the circumstances surrounding the case as it transpired through the U.S.
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When the European powers landed in the Americas, they encountered indigenous people. These societies differed significantly from
those in Western Europe,139 and Europeans quickly devised an array of
approaches for dealing with them.140 Some early approaches, including
those of Franciscus a Victoria, conceded that the indigenous societies
had sovereignty over their territory.141 If, however, the indigenous societies hindered religious teachings or the buildup of European colonies, the King of Spain had the right to acquire sovereignty over them
through the doctrine of conquest.142 In 1493, Pope Alexander VI
granted Spain and Portugal the right to conquer indigenous societies
in the Americas.143 The Pope proposed an alternative argument—
namely, that if the indigenous societies lacked a territorially defensive
governmental structure, then those societies had no rights to their territories.144 Other approaches set forth the concept of a “Family of Nations.”145 To be a member of the Family, indigenous societies had to
have a form of government that advanced beyond a tribal level.146 The
indigenous government and society had to exist within defined, defended territory in accordance with the European model of territorial
definition.147
Under this definition, however, the European powers precluded
many tribes in the Americas from claiming territorial sovereignty despite claims that they possessed a governmental structure that delimited

court system. See id. at 5–23. Robertson discusses, at length, the amount of detail and concern that went into the case, as it relates to terra nullius and tribal rights. See id. at 95–116.
139 See id. at ix. The discovery of the Americas launched a vast desire on the part of the
European sovereigns to colonize the region. See id. The European powers, however, eventually found it necessary “to adapt their traditional worldview to accommodate the Columbian landfall.” Id. The Europeans’ response to this affront on their worldviews was to “devise[] rules intended to justify the dispossession and subjugation of the native peoples of
the Western Hemisphere. Of these rules the most fundamental were those governing the
ownership of land.” Id. at ix.
140 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 406 (noting that at the time “international law did not
recognize the title of wandering tribes or even of settled peoples whose civilization was
regarded as below the European standard”).
141 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 12 (identifying Victoria as one of several scholars who
held this view).
142 See id.
143 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 405.
144 See id. at 18–20.
145 Lindley, supra note 4, at 18–19.
146 See id.
147 See id. at 19 (quoting Portuguese and English publicists who noted that “native
chiefs, half or wholly savage . . . [did] not possess any continued sovereignty, that being a
political right derived from civilization.”) (internal quotations omitted).
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and defended specifically defined territory.148 International law in Europe emerged as an understanding among nation-states circumscribed
by political boundaries; it has never condoned granting official recognition of title to “wandering tribes or even [to] settled peoples whose
civilization was regarded as below the European standard.”149 In essence, this meant that if a people never adopted a formal practice of
precisely delimiting the boundaries of their territory in the European
manner of possession, then the territory was considered by European
States not to be possessed.150
Given the difficulties inherent in any objective attempt to determine the nature of foreign indigenous society’s government and territorial philosophy, the European powers ultimately determined that occupation was, by definition, a right for them to wield over all foreign
peoples.151 The European powers reasoned that the concept of strictly
delimited boundaries, subject to a concomitant burden of active defense, constituted a uniquely Christian political philosophy.152 Any
lands that fell outside the domains of “a Christian prince” constituted
“‘territorium nullius’ subject to acquisition by Papal grant or by discovery
and occupation without regard to the wishes of the native inhabitants.”153 The Europeans, thus, leveraged this doctrine unilaterally and
without regard for the wishes of indigenous societies.154 Over time, the
occupation of lands deemed terra nullius expanded vastly, as the European powers recognized only a limited number of non-European governments.155 To the Europeans, implicit in the very concept of civilization was the European philosophy of territorial integrity.156 No society
without a similar philosophy could be counted as a member of the
Family of Nations, or the community of civilized peoples.157 On this

148 Fenwick, supra note 8, at 406.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 See id.
152 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 26.
153 Korman, supra note 12, at 42 (internal quotations omitted). Some scholars argue,
however, that actual European practice in the Americas more closely resembled cession or
conquest, which necessarily acknowledged the existence of indigenous societies but refused to recognize their rights to sovereignty. See id. at 42–44.
154 Id. at 41.
155 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 12. The only governments so recognized were
those in India, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, China, Japan, Burma, Siam (currently Thailand), and Ethiopia. Id.
156 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 18–19.
157 See id. at 20.
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basis, the Europeans concluded that such people lacked any moral
right to self-determination.158
In later centuries, the doctrine of occupation, premised on the
fictitious association between civilization and territorial delimitation,
became obsolete as undiscovered territories became scarce; European
hegemonies occupied all known lands that lacked a powerful defender.159 Despite the eventual obsolescence of the doctrine of occupation, the concept of terra nullius survives today, and has appeared in
modern cases involving prior takings of land.160 In Western Sahara, the
ICJ issued an advisory opinion regarding whether territory was terra
nullius when it was established as a Spanish colony.161 On behalf of Algeria, Ambassador Mohammed Bedjaoui argued that terra nullius “effectively constituted the legal spearhead of European colonization.”162
In its determination of the validity of the occupation, the ICJ ruled that
“a cardinal condition” to support any claim to territory by way of the
doctrine of occupation is that the land in question be terra nullius—a
territory belonging to no-one—at the time of the act alleged to constitute the ‘occupation.’”163 Restricting the meaning of the term terra nullius, the ICJ held that the land in question was not terra nullius when
Spain sought to occupy it, because one or more peoples, “which, if nomadic, were socially and politically organized in tribes and under chiefs
competent to represent them,” already dwelled there.164 This represented a fundamental shift between the Eurocentric and geocentric
conceptions of the doctrine of occupation; it was the first time international law was interpreted explicitly to eschew the Eurocentric philosophy requiring territorial delimitation and the burden of defense to establish a people’s rights to self-determination.165
More recently, in Mabo v Queensland (No. 2), the High Court of Australia decided a highly publicized terra nullius case in which it determined that title to land claimed by the British actually remained with
indigenous societies unless the British or a successor government (Aus-

158 See id.
159 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 20.
160 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 28.
161 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 1975 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 1 (Oct. 16).
162 Korman, supra note 12, at 42 n.5.
163 Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶ 79.
164 Id. ¶ 81. The court also noted: “[A]uthority in the tribe was vested in a sheikh, subject to the assent of the ‘Juma’a’, that is, of an assembly of its leading members, and the
tribe had its own customary law applicable in conjunction with the Koranic law.” Id. ¶ 88.
165 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 503.
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tralia in this case) had properly extinguished the indigenous title.166
The issue arose when members of the indigenous societies argued that
the land in question, which the Australian government had claimed was
terra nullius, actually constituted an inhabited area.167 The High Court
of Australia held that title remained in the indigenous societies’ hands
unless the government had explicitly extinguished that right.168 This
case, therefore, established a compromise precedent between the original Eurocentric premise of territorial delimitation and burden of defense, and the radically new premise of political organization introduced in Western Sahara.169 Specifically, the difference now lies in
whether the occupying power formally (de jure) enunciated the extinction of the indigenous people’s right to a defined territory.170 This
compromise legitimated the Eurocentric theory that justified European
conquest in past centuries on the theory that no meaningful opportunity existed for further conquest.171
Acquisition via the doctrine of occupation remains an integral part
of the system of international law that emerged from Western civilization’s preference for hegemony.172 Though antiquated as a mode of
accumulating territory, the doctrine, which has evolved over the centuries, is very much alive in long-standing modern territorial disputes.173
From the early stages of the doctrine’s evolution, that allowed vast
claims of title regardless of whether the expansive power actually colonized the land, to later stages, that required colonization followed by a
burden to determine whether the affected peoples constituted a preexisting society recognizable in European territorial theory, the doctrine
eventually evolved to include more generalizable considerations of the
right of self-determination for indigenous societies.174 Issues regarding
prior takings of territory by occupation continue to arise in modern
courts, and courts today must adjudicate the meaning and breadth of
occupation as a justification for territorial acquisition.175

166 Mabo (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR at 119.
167 See id. at 2.
168 See id. at 119.
169 See id.; Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶¶ 81–82.
170 Mabo (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR at 119.
171 See id.
172 See Brownlie, supra note 72, at 123.
173 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 412–419.
174 See id. at 404–406; Jennings, supra note 82, at 82–83.
175 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 20.
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B. The Doctrine of Prescription
Prescription involves “[t]he effect of the lapse of time in creating
and destroying rights.”176 Prescriptive title arises when there is no evidence of title under the doctrines of occupation, conquest, or cession;
the territory in question has been under continuous and undisputed
control long enough to effectively establish a new State; and, the international community has come to accept the government as legitimate
in practice.177 Three criteria are necessary to establish prescription.
First, there must be effective control.178 Second, this control must be
present for a sufficient period to constitute general acceptance of the
control among members of the international community.179 Third, neither the original State nor third-party States must contest this control.180 If “immemorial possession” occurs, such that the origin of title is
unclear, then title is generally presumed to be valid.181
Prescriptive title may also be established when title is defective or
unlawful.182 If a State has effectively and peaceably controlled the territory for a sufficient period, the doctrine of prescription can remedy
defects in title.183 The crucial distinction between the doctrines of occupation and prescription is that under the former the territory must
originally have constituted terra nullius, while under the latter the territory formerly belonged to another State.184 Although the doctrine of
prescription closely resembles the doctrine of adverse possession, they
differ in that under the doctrine of prescription the original title holder must have acquiesced.185 Under the doctrine of prescription, the
claim to territory must be uncontested186 If a third State disputes the
claim of the State claiming title by prescription, title to the territory is
imperfectible.187 For example, in Chamizal the International Boundary
Commission determined that the United States lacked a basis upon

176 Black’s Law Dictionary, supra note 95, at 1302.
177 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 178; Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 150.
178 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 150.
179 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 179.
180 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 150.
181 Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 11.
182 Jennings, supra note 82, at 21.
183 Id.
184 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 150.
185 Id.
186 See Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 51.
187 See id.

22

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 35:1

which to claim territory via the doctrine of prescription because Mexico refused to acquiesce to the claim of the United States.188
The archetypal example of acquisition under the doctrine of prescription is the case of Island of Palmas.189 In its opinion, the Permanent
Court of Arbitration determined that, although Spain had some claim
to the island as a result of having discovered it in 1648, title actually belonged to the Netherlands.190 Here, Spain had discovered the island
and received inchoate title, but never actually occupied it.191 Thus, although Spain claimed ownership, the Netherlands established a sufficiently substantial settlement on the island to constitute occupation.192
That is, under the doctrine of prescription the Netherlands established
“continuous and peaceful display of State authority” on the island.193 In
the eyes of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, it was sufficient for
purposes of establishing title for the Netherlands to display occasional
artifacts of direct and indirect authority over the island, despite the fact
that such activity fell short of the definitional requirement of continuous and numerous displays.194 The difference between the Spanish and
Dutch claims to the Island of Palmas thus consisted of Spain’s mere
claim to title compared with the Netherland’s manifestation of title to
any third party that might go so far as to observe the island’s selfevident ascription.195
The doctrine of prescription was also relevant in Legal Status of
Eastern Greenland.196 Here, the PCIJ determined that, in order to show
title via the doctrine of prescription, it was necessary to demonstrate
two conditions: first, a party must show “the intention and will to act as
sovereign,” and, second, it must show “some actual exercise or display
of such authority.”197 Denmark provided persuasive evidence of both
conditions.198 The shift away from the necessity for substantial occupa188 Chamizal (Mex./U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 309, 328 (Int’l Boundary Comm’n 1911).
189 See Island of Palmas (Neth./U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928); Lesaffer,
supra note 94, at 51.
190 See Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 867–69. Although the dispute in Island of Palmas
was between the Netherlands and the United States, it was necessary for the court to determine Spain’s rights to the islands, as Spain ceded the territory to the United States in
1898. Id. at 837.
191 Id.
192 See id.
193 See id. at 870.
194 See id. at 867.
195 See Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 870.
196 See 1933 P.C.I.J. at 45–46, 48.
197 Id. at 45–46.
198 See id. at 34–36, 48.
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tion and toward the necessity to produce an unambiguous display of
ascription relied on the limiting characteristics of the lands in question.199 In both Island of Palmas and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, the
land in question posed obvious obstacles—geological, climatological,
and geographical—to substantial occupation, such that the courts
needed an alternative theory that accommodated these natural limitations while preserving the burden of demonstrable commitment to
ownership on the part of the claimants.200
Although a State with a claim to territory generally must consent
before it is possible to grant prescription to the land, a State cannot
wait indefinitely to object.201 In the 1959 case of Sovereignty over Certain
Frontier Land, the Boundary Commission of 1843 had previously determined the allocation of territory among the relevant States.202 Later, at
the Convention of 1892, Belgium asserted sovereignty over some disputed territory.203 Although the Netherlands had notice of this claim, it
refrained from repudiating it until 1922.204 As a result of this delay, the
ICJ found for Belgium.205 By comparison, the Chamizal opinion found
that the United States had no legitimate basis to exercise prescription
over territories that Mexico also claimed.206 In Chamizal, the United
States and Mexico disputed their common border in certain places.207
When the United States claimed prescriptive title based on “undisturbed, uninterrupted, and unchallenged possession,” Mexico disputed
this and showed that it had already challenged the boundaries in diplomatic circles.208 The arbitrators thus denied prescriptive title on the
grounds that Mexico had already challenged the U.S. claim.209
C. The Doctrine of Cession
Acquisition under the doctrine of cession occurs when one State
transfers land to another State via treaty.210 It may occur by purchase, as
199 See id. at 50–51.
200 See id.; Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 867.
201 See Sovereignty over Certain Frontier Land (Belg./Neth.), 1959 I.C.J. 209, 229–30
( June 20).
202 Id. at 222.
203 Id. at 229.
204 Id. at 229–230.
205 See id. at 230.
206 See id.; Chamizal, 11 R.I.A.A. at 329; Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 51.
207 See Chamizal, 11 R.I.A.A. at 317.
208 Id. at 328–29.
209 See id. at 329.
210 See Fenwick, supra note 8, at 422.
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occurred with the Louisiana Purchase.211 It can also occur by exchange,
as evidenced by the 1890 cession by Great Britain of the island of Helgoland to Germany in exchange for territory adjoining German East
Africa.212 Alternatively, a peace treaty may govern the transfer of land,
such that the value-in-exchange consists of the agreement to a permanent cessation of hostilities.213 Cession creates “the formal transfer
from one state to another of the sovereignty over a definite area of territory.”214 The doctrine of cession is the only mode of acquisition that
requires the enunciated intentions of at least two States.215 The receiving State must manifestly intend to receive the land and subsequently
establish sovereignty.216 Likewise, the ceding State must manifestly intend to transfer the land and relinquish all claims of sovereignty.217
This form of title is derivative, not original.218 Thus, the validity of the
receiving State’s title is dependent upon the validity of the ceding
State’s title.219 Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet: No
party has the power to transfer a right to another that is greater than
that which he actually possesses.220
In past centuries, a transfer made under duress—that is, under the
threat of force—was a valid manner of transferring title.221 For a time,
tribunals even considered the doctrines of conquest and cession as alternative, coexisting justifications for territorial acquisition.222 The
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention),
however, declared that, “[a] cession by treaty is void where the conclusion of the treaty has been procured by the threat or use of force
. . . .”223 The author posits that this also constituted a point of departure
between the former Eurocentric elaborations of international law for
the purpose of forestalling conflict among the members of Western
civilization, and the modern recognition that the era of Eurocentric
international law had ended for the sake of the universality of the law.
211 Id. at 423.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 425.
214 Id. at 422.
215 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 16.
216 See 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 70, §§ 244–245.
217 See id.
218 Jennings, supra note 82, at 16.
219 See id.
220 Translated by the author.
221 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 19.
222 Cf. id. (suggesting that cession resulting from coercion coexists with, rather than
erases, title by conquest).
223 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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D. The Doctrine of Conquest
The doctrine of conquest is one of the earliest and most prominent
doctrines of acquisition.224 Title by conquest was perfectible if the conquering State declared an intention to conquer, took the territory by
force, and had the ability to govern it.225 Most States in past centuries
considered this a valid method of acquisition.226 The European powers
colonized Asian territories largely via the doctrines of conquest and cession.227 The British acquisition of India, the Dutch acquisition of the
Caribbean islands known as the East Indies, and the Russian acquisition
of most of northern and central Asia are just a few examples.228 Moreover, the strongest European States continued to pursue the conquest of
the European continent, controverting Eurocentric international law.229
The doctrine of conquest gave the victorious State sovereignty over
the conquered territories and their indigenous societies.230 Winning in
battle alone, however, was insufficient to transfer title.231 Annexation
was also necessary to establish sovereignty, and established an expectation that unambiguous artifacts of annexation would be manifested.232
The conqueror must intend to govern the territory, have effective possession and control, and no exiled government or allies thereof may
exist to contest control.233 International law recognized title as valid if
the conquered State was totally destroyed (debellatio), through a peace
treaty granting cession, or if the failed State acquiesced.234 If the land
failed to pass through cession and a peace treaty, however, claimants to
the land resorted to the doctrine of uti possidetis.235 Further, in the absence of a treaty, it was necessary to show that the war had completely
ended, and the defeated society must have surrendered and submitted
224 See Zane, supra note 1, at 32. Referring to tribes around 10,000 B.C., Zane notes
that “[f]ierce fighting must have gone on among these various tribes . . . for the acquisitive
instinct . . . came into play.” Id. at 32–33. Further, Zane notes that the concept of property
developed when humans originally began hunting for food supplies. Id. at 33. It was common practice for tribes to acquire personal hunting grounds, upon which “[a]ny encroachment by another tribe would be repelled by force.” Id.
225 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 160.
226 See id.
227 Korman, supra note 12, at 64.
228 Id.
229 See id. at 66.
230 Id. at 64.
231 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 160.
232 Id. at 160–61.
233 See id. at 164.
234 See Korman, supra note 12, at 9.
235 Lindley, supra note 4, at 160; see supra text accompanying note 95.
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to the new authority.236 It was necessary to show by evidence that resistance by the opposing society, and any of its allies, had ceased.237
The conquering State’s intention is crucial in considerations of
title under the doctrine of conquest. Although intent may often be inferred from the State’s actions, only some cases of conquest result in
annexation.238 During World War II,239 the members of the WesternOrthodox alliance240 “expressly disclaimed the intention of annexing
Germany, although they had occupied all of Germany’s territory and
defeated all of Germany’s allies.”241 Thus, in addition to conquering
the territory, extension of civil administration and incorporation of the
territory into the acquiring State is necessary for the completion of title.242
The doctrine of conquest has become an obsolete justification for
acquisition. 243 International law has either entirely extinguished or
heavily restricted recognition of title under this doctrine.244 These restrictions on territorial rights under the doctrine of conquest result
from shifts in moral views during the twentieth century, as human
rights have become more influential in policy determinations.245
II. Segue into Modernism
World War I, a Western civilizational conflict, was devastating both
for European States and for peripheral States affected by the hostilities.246 After the war, the international diplomatic community—which,
236 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 161.
237 Korman, supra note 12, at 109–11.
238 See id. at 120.
239 World War II may be construed as a broad, intercivilizational war as it actively involved three civilizations: Western, Far East, and Orthodox (predominantly Russian). See 1
Toynbee, supra note 11, at 51. Furthermore, operations extended into territories of the
Islamic, Sinic, and Hindu civilizations (North Africa and Southeast Asian island nations,
China, and India, respectively). See id.; John Graham Royde-Smith, World Wars, in Encyclopedia Britannica 986–96 (Philip W. Goetz ed., 15th ed. 1983).
240 The Western-Orthodox alliance—also known as the Allied powers—was dominated
by British, U.S., and Russian forces. See 1 Toynbee, supra note 11, at 51. The opposition,
known as the Axis, also included Western civilizations, and can be construed as a WesternJapanese alliance. See id.
241 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 151–52.
242 Korman, supra note 12, at 9.
243 See id. at 133.
244 Id. at 191–92.
245 See id. at 238–44.
246 World War I originated in the Balkan States, which comprise a potentially volatile
mix of three civilizations, including the Islamic, Western, and Orthodox. See 1 Toynbee,
supra note 11, at 51; Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Origins of World War I, 18 J. Interdisc.
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at the time, consisted primarily of Europeans—determined that allowing territorial acquisition as a result of war was an open invitation to
further conflict.247 States began a series of reforms to disclaim annexation as a means of resolving conflict, and they proceeded to advance
the doctrine of self-determination as the basis for forming a political
State.248 To realize this goal, international organizations like the
League of Nations were established and tasked with promoting
peace.249
As States began to embrace the doctrine of self-determination as
the peaceful, and, therefore, proper justification for territorial transfer,
the legacy doctrines of acquisition quickly began a decline into obsolescence.250 Possession, a common element of the legacy modes, has made
its way into modern doctrines.251 Specifically, “effective possession and
control” are requirements for the doctrines of both prescription and
occupation.252 Although the latter did not require immediate possession to establish rights to a territory, occupation was required for title
to be perfected.253 Under the doctrine of prescription, “the intention
and will to act as a sovereign” was an absolute necessity.254 Under the
doctrine of conquest, title could only be legitimated by actual possession of the land or by way of the doctrine of cession.255 Even in the case
of cession, many authorities required some form of effective control to
justify recognition of the acquisition.256
States continue to advance legacy modes of acquisition to support
their claims to territory.257 The rationale for this is simply that modern
courts continue to look to effective possession as a determinative factor
in the resolution of a case.258 In Minquiers and Ecrehos, the ICJ looked to
Hist. 795, 795 (1988). Germany lay at the center of both conflicts in Europe, however the
role of non-Western civilizations was more clearly peripheral in WWI than in WWII. See
Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II 6–7
(1994).
247 See Korman, supra note 12, at 150–51.
248 Id. at 152–56; see Woodrow Wilson, Address to Congress: The Fourteen Points ( Jan.
8, 1918).
249 Korman, supra note 12, at 151.
250 See id. at 133.
251 Jennings, supra note 82, at 23.
252 Id.
253 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 149–50.
254 Id. at 150.
255 See Lindley, supra note 4, at 160.
256 Shearer, supra note 3, at 146.
257 See Minquiers and Ecrehos (Fr./U.K.), 1953 I.C.J. 47, 50–51 (Nov. 17).
258 See id. at 57.
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numerous treaties to determine possession.259 France and Britain contested title to fishing islets in the English Channel.260 After reviewing
numerous treaties and negotiations concerning the islets that dated
from feudal times, the ICJ looked to which State could demonstrate the
most effective possession.261 Ultimately, having determined that its actions better demonstrated effective possession, the ICJ ruled for Great
Britain.262
Relatedly, former ICJ Justice de Visscher suggested a non-traditional mode of acquisition, namely, consolidation of title.263 Under this
theory, claim to title is a determined by a variety of factors, and the judicial authority would attempt to identify a coherent logic across possibly conflicting doctrines.264 Tribunals would consider evidence of recognition, estoppel, and acquiescence.265 This complex relationship had
“the effect of attaching a territory . . . to a given state.”266 Possession is a
heavy consideration in consolidation of title.267 Under the theory, possession “is the foundation and the sine qua non of this process of consolidation,” as long as the possession is of sufficiently long duration.268
In this context, possession is different from the requirements for possession under the doctrine of prescription, as no requirement exists
that possession be manifestly peaceful or uncontested.269
In the Eritrea-Yemen arbitration, a proceeding to resolve a title
dispute over the Red Sea Islands, there was very little evidence of which
State controlled governmental functions on the islands.270 The tribunal
thus applied the theory of consolidation of title, specifically examining
evidence of the “demonstration of use, presence, display of governmental authority, and other ways of showing a possession which may gradually consolidate into a title.”271 In making its ruling, the tribunal stated
259 See id. at 54.
260 Id. at 49, 57.
261 Id. at 57.
262 Id. at 72.
263 Shaw, supra note 15, at 507. de Visscher was a member of the ICJ from 1946 to
1952. P. Couvreur, Charles de Visscher and International Justice, 11 Eur. J. Int’l L. 905, 930
(2000).
264 Cf. Shaw, supra note 15, at 507 (differentiating consolidation from more limited
theoretical bases for acquisition).
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 25–26.
268 Id. at 26.
269 Id. at 25.
270 Award of the Arbitral Tribunal in the First Stage of the Proceedings (Territorial
Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute) (Eri./Yemen), 22 R.I.A.A. 211, 274 (1998).
271 Id. at 311–12.
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that under modern international law, “an intentional display of power
and authority over the territory . . . on a continuous and peaceful basis”
is critical for territorial acquisition.272
Under the legacy doctrine of occupation, effective possession is
required to perfect title, as this enables a powerful State to exert control over a smaller nation or tribe.273 Today, traditional modes of acquisition are increasingly becoming obsolete; effective possession, however,
persists as a central consideration for almost all acquisitions.274 The obsolescence of the doctrine of occupation thus fails to nullify the benefits of controlling territory.275 Instead, powerful States retain their ability to exercise control in acquiring territory; only the rationales behind
the acquisitions have shifted.276
A. Self-Determination and the End of the Doctrine of Conquest
With the advent of international agreements intended to end war
as a means of resolving disputes, the doctrine of conquest began a decline.277 International organizations like the League of Nations, the
U.N., and the World Trade Organization (WTO)278 have made acquisition by “threat or use of force” invalid by international mandate.279
The victorious European powers founded the League of Nations
based in part on U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points,
which he proposed in his address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress
on January 8, 1918.280 The Fourteen Points sought simply to encourage
lasting peace.281 The final Point called for an international association
to guarantee “political independence and territorial integrity to great
and small states alike.”282 The League’s purpose is manifest in Article 10;

272 Id. at 268.
273 See supra text accompanying notes 83–89.
274 See Shaw, supra note16, 502–07 (discussing how States continue to gain control
over territory through effective control).
275 See id.
276 See id.
277 See Korman, supra note 12, at 133.
278 The WTO was originally the General Agreement and Tariffs and Trade (GATT), an
outgrowth of the Bretton-Woods conferences on establishing standards for the revival of a
viable world monetary condition. See Shaw, supra note 15, at 1285–87.
279 U.N. Charter art. 2, para 4; see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 187, 189 ( June 27).
280 See Wilson, supra note 248.
281 See id.
282 Id.
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namely, that the body of States should cooperate “[i]n case of any such
aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression.”283
Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant pronounced that
member States would “respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence” of the
other member States.284 The international community generally agreed
that Article 10 prohibited acquisition by force and made no exception
for circumstances, like cases of self-defense, in which the use of force
would otherwise be acceptable.285 The language of Article 10 carried
forward to the current Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, which requires
all members of the U.N. to refrain from utilizing the “threat or use of
force” in any “manner inconsistent with [p]urposes of the United Nations.”286
Questions have arisen as to whether it is ever proper to acquire
territory from an aggressor State that loses a war.287 Great Britain argued that Article 10 only abolished acquisition by conquest generally,
but did not prohibit it in all situations—it argued, for example, for an
exception justifying the acquisition of territory as punishment for aggressions.288 Others argued that if the Council or PCIJ recommended
an adjustment of borders, then it would be necessary to permit the use
of force to enforce the judgment.289 Another view was that annexation
at the end of a conflict was permissible if a League of Nations covenant
justified the war.290 Finally, many authorities read Article 10 as banning
all acquisitions of territory by force under any circumstances.291
The purpose of these post-World War I reforms was to restrict the
benefits that States stood to receive from war.292 Despite these reforms,
the members of the Western-Orthodox alliance controlled the disposition of German territories.293 The victorious powers left Germany largely intact and established the Weimar Republic from the German prov-

283 League of Nations Covenant art. 10.
284 Id.
285 See Korman, supra note 12, at 181–86.
286 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
287 Korman, supra note 12, at 182.
288 Id. at 186.
289 Id. at 187.
290 Id.
291 Id. at 182–83.
292 Id. at 185–86.
293 See, e.g., Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm
6–7 (1948).
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inces. 294 Under the Treaty of Versailles, the League of Nations controlled Germany’s colonies through the Mandates System.295
The Mandates System appointed a “Mandatory State” to administer the colonies under a prescribed set of terms, while the League of
Nations retained ultimate authority.296 The Mandatory State acted as
trustee of the former colonies when the members of the League of Nations deemed the colonies unable to protect themselves politically.297
Despite disdainful protests from the international community about
acquisition by way of the doctrine of conquest, the League of Nations
effectively permitted such action through the Mandates System by simply providing formal legitimacy.298 “[T]he Allied victory seemed merely
to represent a new peak of imperial expansion conducted by the victors
at the expense of the vanquished.”299 The League of Nations suffered a
failure in the form of rejection by the U.S. Senate—the same fate suffered by the Treaty of Versailles.300 Nevertheless, the United States insisted that it was entitled to participate in the system of mandates established by the new international organization in had declined to join.301
B. Annexation Issues During World War II
World War II was the result of a plethora of socioeconomic, political and other factors that combined to stifle German recovery after
World War I.302 A major factor traces its origins to World War I, namely,
294 Id. at 7.
295 See League of Nations Covenant art. 22.
296 See id. (establishing the framework of the Mandates System). Among other considerations, this framework required that the “tutelage” of “those territories and colonies
which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the
States which formally governed them . . . to be entrusted to advanced nations . . . .” Id. art.
22, paras. 1–2. It also directed that each Mandatory State provide support “according to
the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its
economic conditions and other circumstances.” Id. art. 22, para. 3. Mandatory States were
also required to provide annual reports to the League of Nations Council regarding their
entr usted territories. Id. art. 22, para. 7.
297 See id.
298 Korman, supra note 12, at 142–43.
299 Id. at 141.
300 See id. at 159 (noting that the United States failed to ratify both the League of Nations and the Treaty of Versailles).
301 See id. (“[T]he position of the United States in putting forth its claim to participation in the assignment and formulation of the terms of the League Mandates: the Principal Allied Powers gained title to the German colonies by conquest and, since [the United
States] assisted in the defeat of the Central Powers, . . . it [is] entitled to a share in all the
spoils of victory . . . .”).
302 See generally Churchill, supra note 293 (discussing in great detail the historical circumstances after World War I that led to World War II).
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the taking of German territories as sanctions for its role in that war.303
In addition to the effect of heavy monetary sanctions, the loss of land
was devastating to the German people.304 Rumors exist to the effect
that, shortly after signing the Treaty of Versailles, French Marshal Ferdinand Foch, an advocate of heavy sanctions on Germany, stated: “This
is not Peace. It is an Armistice for twenty years.”305 Sir Winston Churchill was also critical of the methods by which the Armistice sought to
achieve peace.306 Specifically, he believed that a “cardinal tragedy was
the complete break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.”307 Regarding
Mein Kampf, Churchill stated that Hitler desired the expansion of Germany in order to restore the nation’s prior greatness.308
1. The Kellogg-Briand Pact in World War II
Between World War I and World War II there were several international attempts to discourage war. Prominent among these efforts, the
Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 (the Pact), also known as the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, renounced warfare as a means of resolving international controversies.309 Although the Pact failed to specify
that self-defense was an exception, arguably it implied as much.310
Moreover, the Pact withdrew protection from States that breached the
Pact.311 Further, the Pact permitted the annexation of territory as a
sanction against an aggressor State if the international community determined such action was warranted.312 World War II, however, was supposedly the outgrowth of justified actions under the Pact, and yet it fell
short of prohibiting the imposition of forcible territorial changes upon
an aggressor.313
At the close of World War II, the members of the Western-Orthodox alliance redistributed the conquered territories.314 The United
States put the Pacific Islands under a “strategic trust,” and the Soviet
303 See id. at 54. The French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 provides just one example
of how Germany effectively lost their lands following World War I. Id.
304 See id. at 7.
305 See id.
306 See id. at 10.
307 Id.
308 See Churchill, supra note 293 at 57.
309 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy art. 5,
Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57 [hereinafter Kellogg-Briand Pact].
310 See Korman, supra note 12, at 193.
311 Id. at 198.
312 Id.
313 See id. at 199.
314 See id. at 161–62.
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Union annexed parts of Poland, the former Prussia, and the Sakhalin
Islands to the north of Japan.315 The Atlantic Charter encouraged the
concept of self-determination while suggesting that the members of the
Western-Orthodox alliance disclaim any rights to the territory that they
had captured.316 Poland also annexed a portion of Germany in order
to provide a “short and more easily defensible frontier between Poland
and Germany.”317 The distribution and annexation of territory after
World War II seems to indicate that the Kellogg-Briand Pact permitted
the international community to effect territorial changes.318 Although
the Pact prohibited individual cases of conquest for territory, the manner in which the victorious powers annexed Germany after World War
II is strong evidence that annexation is permissible if the international
community agrees to it.319
2. The Role of the U.N.
It is human nature to pursue ways to improve one’s comfort and
security. Applied on a national scale, this tendency can lead to a desire
to reach out and conquer territory unilaterally, taking from another for
the unilateral betterment of one’s own State regardless of the expense
to the affected party.320 In the period of European colonial expansion,
a common purpose was the acquisition of resources.321 Prior to this period, and again after it, the purpose was largely security—for example,
the Soviet Union’s dominance of Eastern Europe was intended to secure resources and shore up national security.322
The founding members of the U.N. developed that institution to
unify States and promote international cooperation for peace and sta315 Id. at 163, 167, 168–69. The strategic trust utilized under the Pacific Islands Mandate differed from a typical trust territory, in that the Security Council performed all U.N.
functions under a strategic trust. Id. at 163. This resulted in America’s ability to establish
naval and military bases, which effectively created a strategic area, rather than a trust State.
Id.
316 See id. at 162.
317 3 Marjorie M. Whiteman, Dep’t of State, Digest of International Law 348–
49 (1964) (quoting a radio address made by President Truman to the United States regarding the Berlin Conference) (internal quotations omitted).
318 See Korman, supra note 12, at 199.
319 See id.
320 See 1 D.W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective on
500 Years of History 6–7 (1988).
321 See id.
322 See, e.g., Charles H. Fairbanks, Jr., Gorbachev’s Global Doughnut: The Empire with a Hole
in the Middle, in Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy: From Brezhnev to
Gorbachev 600–03 (Frederic J. Fleron, Jr. et al., eds., 1991).
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bility.323 The U.N. Charter has at its foundation reforms developed in
response to the experiences and effects of World War I and World War
II.324 There is a specific focus on peaceful resolution of international
disputes and the role of self-determination in acquisitions.325 As noted
in Article 1(2) of the U.N. Charter, a crucial goal of the U.N. is to join
States together in “respect for the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples.”326
The U.N. attempted to restrict States’ abilities to conquer foreign
nations in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.327 Article 2(4) states that
“[a]ll Members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations.”328 This construction is clearly similar
to that of Article 10 of the League of Nations Charter.329 As was the case
with Article 10, Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter has been the subject of
much study and interpretation.330 Most read the resolution as a ban on
the use of force against any other party subject to two exceptions.331
First, there is no justification to use force unless it is part of a U.N.323 See U.N. Charter art. 1. The purposes of the U.N. charter are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the
peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other
appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
3. To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems
of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting
and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment
of these common ends.
Id.

324 See U.N. Charter pmbl.
325 See id. art. 1, para. 2.
326 Id.
327 See Brownlie, supra note 72, at 699.
328 U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
329 See id.; League of Nations Covenant art. 10 (“The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League.”).
330 See Brownlie, supra note 72, at 699–700.
331 See id. at 699–703.
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authorized collective action to maintain or restore international
peace.332 Second, self-defense against armed attacks is permissible until
the U.N. can intervene to preserve or restore peace and security among
the disputants.333
With regard to acquisition by force, many authorities argue that
the U.N. Charter admits no circumstances under which it is ever possible to legitimate the acquisition of territory by threat or actual imposition of force.334 Hence, when a State acquires territory as a result of
self-defense, there may be a temporary occupation, but there can be no
legal transfer of title.335 There are several rationales for this blanket
prohibition. For example, there are practical restrictions on any realistic ability to expand acquisitional rights.336 Further, a principle of proportionality suggests that any use of force in self-defense must constitute a clear necessity vis-à-vis the degree of the threat faced by the
defending State.337 One form of evidence of necessity is the immediacy
of the retaliation.338 Beyond necessity and immediacy, retaliation must
also be proportional to the seriousness of the threat.339 Another rationale for the strict limitations on acquisition by conquest is the right of
self-determination.
3. Self-Determination and the Expansion of European Hegemony
The concept of self-determination is probably the most wellestablished feature of the modern philosophy of national rights.340
Reaching back as far as the North American colonies’ struggle for independence within the British realm, and extending to peoples outside
the boundaries of Western civilization, this concept has become an internationally recognized rule.341 Its broad acceptance is further evidence of the obsolescence of the doctrine of conquest in the present
332 U.N. Charter arts. 39, 42.
333 Id. art. 51.
334 See Korman, supra note 12, at 200.
335 See id. at 210.
336 See id. at 206–08.
337 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 314, 317.
338 Id. at 316–17.
339 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 905
(1987) (“[A] state victim of a violation of an international obligation by another state may
resort to countermeasures that might otherwise be unlawful, if such measures (a) are necessary to terminate the violation or prevent further violation, or to remedy the violation;
and (b) are not out of proportion to the violation and the injury suffered.”); see Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 316–17.
340 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 326–27.
341 Id.
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day.342 Under this theory, acquisition by force can no longer divest a territory’s people of their rights because those rights are conferred inalienably on the original, rightful inhabitants.343 As States began to recognize this right, opportunities for acquisition by force began to
diminish substantially.344 In 1970, the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations
(Declaration on Principles of International Law) determined the following rule:
The territory of a State shall not be the object of acquisition
by another State resulting from the threat or use of force. No
territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of force
shall be recognized as legal.
....
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty
to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the
Charter.345
In addition to suggesting that any threat or actual imposition of force
voids acquisition of territory, the declaration clearly mandates that individuals should have rights of self-determination.346
III. Some Jurisprudential and Pragmatic Considerations Today
Viewed two-dimensionally, the Earth possesses a vast but finite surface area.347 States controlling the surface area also control the subter342 See Korman, supra note 12, at 228.
343 See id. at 227.
344 See id.
345 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970) (emphasis added).
346 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 327.
347 See The World Factbook, Cent. Intelligence Agency, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html (follow hyperlink to expand “Geography:
WORLD”) (last visited Jan. 10, 2012) (stating that the total surface area of Earth is 510.072
million sq. km.; land comprises 148.94 million sq. km. (29.1% of the surface area), while
water encompasses 361.132 million sq. km. (70.9% of the surface area)); see also Nina Caspersen & Gareth Stansfield, Introduction, in Unrecognized States in the International
System 1–8 (Nina Caspersen & Gareth Stansfield eds., 2011) (describing the division of
the Earth’s surface into entities that control delineated territory).
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ranean soil, and adjacent waters and airspace.348 The Earth is the foundation for international society, which itself is “subject to the ebb and
flow of political life,” where new States supplant the old.349 When nation-states claim sovereignty over land previously held by predecessor
states, the international community must decide when and if to accept
the new claim.350 The decision to accept the new claim is an act of recognition, a “formal acknowledgement by one state that another state
exists as a separate and independent government.”351 Note, however,
that acceptance of a State’s existence does not presuppose official recognition of the State’s government via diplomatic relations.352
A. State vs. Political Recognition
Throughout human history, nations have resorted to war to settle
international disputes, and the relatively new collection of international
organizations founded with the objective of achieving peace are simply
incapable of thwarting this inherent human tendency.353 Despite the
best efforts of these well-intentioned groups, nations will continue to
attempt to extend their territories and promulgate their beliefs
through conquest.354 Existing and new nation-states acquire territory.355 The predecessor State may choose to accept the acquisition of
territory, or it may appeal to the international community for redress
against the acquiring State.356
Governments must distinguish between state and political recognition.357 A lack of diplomatic relations does not mean that States do not
recognize each other as independent States.358 States need not accord
formal recognition to any other State, but will treat others as inde-

348 Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 11
(1965) (“The territory of a state consists of (a) its land area; (b) its internal waters and
their beds; (c) its territorial sea and the bed of the territorial sea; and (d) the subsoil under, and . . . the air space above, (a), (b), and (c).”).
349 See Shaw, supra note 15 at 444.
350 See id.
351 8 West’s Encyclopedia of American Law 252 (2d ed. 2004).
352 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 444–45.
353 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 59–61.
354 Cf. 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 70, § 55(3) (listing twentiethcentury examples of the seizure of occupation of foreign territory by a state).
355 See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 15, at 492–509 (discussing the methods by which States—
both existing and new—acquire territory).
356 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 79–80.
357 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 444–46.
358 See id. at 446–47.
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pendent State entities that meet with certain requirements.359 Upon
the occurrence of a transitional event, existing States determine
whether to recognize the change, and if so, decide on “the kind of legal
entity” the new State assumes.360 States render such decisions based on
policy and other political considerations.361 Recognition therefore occurs after the event that purportedly establishes the new nation-state.362
Recognition is a crucial factor for prescription.363 As noted previously, recognition requires that other States recognize a State’s right to
territory in order to effectuate prescription.364 In the modern context,
States have sought to justify recognition in cases wherein they had illegally conquered territory but held it indefinitely.365 Although much of
the international community now rejects the legacy doctrines of justification for territorial acquisition, it is necessary to address the fact that
States will continue to acquire territory even if what they seize lacks internationally-recognized title.366 If acquisition through force persists
despite international condemnation, recognition and prescription are
the two best means of response.367 Eventually, the international community needs to know who has title to the territory; after all, title must
belong to someone.368 Permitting the vanquished party to hold de jure
title could pose significant problems.369 Recognition, which implies
prescription, is the better doctrine through which to accomplish a
transfer of title.370 Scholars have called recognition “the primary way in

359 See id.
360 See id. at 444–54 (examining historical examples of state recognition).
361 See id. at 445. For example, the United States refused to recognize the People’s Republic of China and North Korea based primarily on political judgment. Id. at 445. Although both foreign governments “exercised effective control over their respective territories,” the United States wanted to preclude the legal effects resulting from recognition. Id.
“Recognition is [thus] a statement by an international legal person as to the status in international law of another real or alleged international legal person or of the validity of a
particular factual situation.” Id.
362 See id.
363 See id. at 148.
364 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 504–05.
365 See id. at 500.
366 See id.
367 Cf. Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 150–51, 154–56 (noting that States may acknowledge the expansion of another state’s territory through prescription and recognition).
368 See id. at 74–75.
369 See id. at 153.
370 Cf. Shaw, supra note 15, at 444–45, 490 (stating that “the essence of territorial sovereignty is contained in the notion of title,” and discussing recognition as a means of defining territorial sovereignty among the international community).
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which the international community has sought to reconcile illegality or
doubt with political reality and the need for certainty.”371
Recognition is achievable by the official acknowledgment by a
number of States that the party in possession should indeed have title to
the land.372 Several prerequisites are necessary to validate recognition.373 First, the recognition must consist of an express statement.374
Second, the conquest must benefit from de jure recognition, rather
than simply de facto recognition.375 Third, the new State must be recognized by third-party States.376 Additionally, the third-party States that
recognize title must generally have some legal claim to the territory,
unless “a considerable number of other States have likewise recognized
title.”377
Although the concept of recognition in international affairs is useful for the determination of title, in practice the opposite concept—
non-recognition—is a more frequent remedy when territory is acquired
by force.378 Express non-recognition by an exiled government, a thirdparty State, or the U.N. acts to bar prescription.379 Affected parties have
used this doctrine frequently in response to the use of force to seize
territory.380 The Stimson Doctrine employed the principle of nonrecognition with respect to Japan.381 Specifically, U.S. Secretary of State
Henry Stimson announced that the United States would refrain from
granting official approval of Japan’s aggression against China in establishing a surrogate State in Manchuria.382 The Stimson Doctrine broke
sharply from the traditional view that, regardless of the legality of the
war, an action of conquest and annexation vests title to the territory in
371 Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa: International Legal Issues 23–
24 (1986).
372 See 1 Oppenheim’s International Law, supra note 70, § 39.
373 See id. § 45.
374 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 155.
375 Id. A de jure recognition occurs when a State formally fulfills the requirements of
statehood. Shearer, supra note 3, at 130. De facto recognition accords statehood because
the facts of the situation justify it. Id. However, international law considers the territorial
title defective under this circumstance: “[I]f the recognizing state says that it recognizes
the conquest only de facto, it is saying in effect that it regards the conqueror’s title as defective, and such a statement obviously cannot give the conqueror good title to the territory.” Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 155.
376 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 155.
377 Jennings, supra note 82, at 44.
378 See id. at 67–68.
379 See id. at 44.
380 See id.
381 See, e.g., Korman, supra note 12, at 239.
382 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 152.
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the victor.383 Shortly after the United States enunciated the Stimson
Doctrine, the League of Nations passed a resolution concurring with
the notion that stating that States should refrain from recognizing “any
situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means
contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations.”384 This directed
States to assume an obligation to refuse recognition of any territorial
change undertaken by way of the threat or use of force.385
Similarly, the Declaration on Principles of International Law states
that, “[n]o territorial acquisition resulting from the threat or use of
force shall be recognized as legal.”386 In Legal Consequences for States of
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), the ICJ validated as a
governing principle each State’s duty to refrain from granting official
sanction to an action when the U.N. Security Council has determined
the action to be illegal.387 The international community, however, has
often applied the standard inconsistently.388 For example, in 1961, India invaded the Portuguese colony of Goa,389 claiming that Portugal
had contravened its obligations under the Declaration on the Granting
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and, therefore,
that Portugal’s possession was illegal.390 Portugal countered that India
violated Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter when it forcibly acquired the
territory.391 When the case came before the U.N. Security Council, the
Council refused to condemn the act for political reasons.392 Though it
was feasible to grant the people of Goa the right to form their own government,393 and despite manifest violations of international law by India, the Council permitted annexation under the “colonial enclave”
exception, rather than extending to Goa an official right of selfdetermination.394 This exception applies to annexations wherein the
383 See, e.g., Korman, supra note 12, at 239.
384 League of Nations Official Journal, Records of the Special Session of the Assembly,
Special Supplement No. 101, 87 (1932); Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 152.
385 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 152.
386 G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 345, at 123.
387 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. 16, ¶¶ 116, 119 ( June 21).
388 See Korman, supra note 12, at 269–70.
389 Id. at 267.
390 See G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514(XV) (Dec. 14, 1960).
391 See Korman, supra note 12, at 267, 270.
392 See id. 269–70.
393 See id. 272–74.
394 See id.

2012]

The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition

41

acquired territory shares ethnic and geographic links with the conquering State.395
In the early twentieth century, the United States accepted and
helped apply Declarative Theory principles toward recognition of new
States in the Americas and the Caribbean.396 The 1933 Montevideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (Montevideo Convention) established the process, still in use today, for nation-state recognition under international law.397 Under the Montevideo Convention,
“[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following
qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c)
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states.”398
Further, the Montevideo Convention delineates between a State’s political stature and recognition by other States.399 “The political existence of
the state is independent of recognition by the other states.”400 Although
the Montevideo Convention dealt exclusively with States in the Americas
and the Caribbean, over time its treaty has transformed into a restatement of international law.401 For example, the Montevideo Convention’s definition of a State survived into the late twentieth century.402 In
1991, the European Union applied this definition as a basis for recognizing Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia as independent States.403 Switzerland applies the Montevideo Convention’s definition to recognize
States, but distinguishes state recognition from political recognition.404
India treats recognition “as a matter of course or routine” once “condi395 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 390. National unity and territorial integrity of a
country are crucial concerns for the U.N., thus, any attempt made to disrupt this is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter. See U.N. Charter art. 2,
para. 4.
396 See Convention on the Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S
3802 [hereinafter Montevideo Convention].
397 See id.
398 Id.
399 Id. art. 3.
400 Id.
401 See, e.g., Cases and Materials on International Law 99 (D.J. Harris ed., 6th ed.
2004).
402 Id.
403 Alain Pellet, The Opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the
Self-Determination of Peoples, 3 Eur. J. Int’l L. 178, 182 (1992).
404 See The Recognition of States and Governments, Switz. Fed. Dep’t Foreign Aff.,
http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/home/topics/intla/cintla/recco.html (last modified
Dec. 10, 2009) (“[T]here is no obligation under international law to recognize other
states. . . . Where the recognition of governments is concerned, the central element is the
exercise of sovereign power over the state. . . . Switzerland is in favour of the widest-possible
recognition of states, but it is extremely reticent about recognizing governments.”).
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tions of statehood have been fulfilled.”405
Despite the potential
benefits of non-recognition, it remains inefficient in protecting territorial boundaries. Unless the international community is willing to exert
enough force on aggressor nations, States will continue to conquer
neighboring nations in the face of international condemnation.406
A prime example of the inefficiency of non-recognition is Israel’s
conquests in Palestine. In 1967, Israel captured territory that was part of
the original Mandate for Palestine.407 In 1980, Israel passed an act to
legalize its annexation of East Jerusalem.408 The U.N. Security Council
was quick to condemn the act.409 Although most States view the war as
valid self-defense, none have recognized Israel’s right to title in East Jerusalem.410 Despite such international condemnation and use of nonrecognition, Israel continues to hold possession of the territory.411
There have been more recent examples of the successful use of nonrecognition—namely, the first Gulf War. In that instance, the international community came together in condemnation of Iraq and provided
assistance to Kuwait in order to expel the aggressing force, to restore
possession to Kuwait, and to maintain the territorial rights of Iraq.412
B. The Doctrine of Uti Possidetis
Under the doctrine of uti possidetis, colonial boundaries remain
after a colony achieves independence.413 This doctrine is a reasonable
solution in the limited context of colonies that become independent
States.414 The principal goal of uti possidetis is to find political solutions
to territorial disputes and avoid conflict.415 One of the earliest applications of the doctrine occurred during the independence of the States
405 See K.P. Misra, India’s Policy of Recognition of States and Governments, 55 Am. J. Int’l L.
398, 422 (1961).
406 See Korman, supra note 12, at 248.
407 See, e.g., id. at 252.
408 Id. at 254.
409 S.C. Res. 478, ¶¶ 1–7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/478 (Aug. 20, 1980); see Korman, supra
note 12, at 254.
410 See Korman, supra note 12, at 255–56.
411 See id. at 254.
412 See id. at 215–16.
413 See generally Duncan, supra note 95 (taking account of the doctrine’s role in the
United States by looking deeply into territorial acquisitions and the utilization of uti possidetis since the time of the establishment of European hegemony in America).
414 See id. at 543. While utilizing uti possidetis is somewhat easy and simplistic in its concept, there are practical concerns that demand a dialectic. See id. Issues such as cultural
and economic gaps and geographical problems may create a necessity to redraw the
boundary lines, rather than leave them to the simplicity of uti possidetis. Id.
415 See Brownlie, supra note 72, at 129–30.
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of Central and South America.416 By permitting the new States to adopt
the boundary lines of the former colonies from which they emerged,
the application of the doctrine prevented border disputes among the
new States and forestalled further European intervention.417
States throughout the world have justified territorial acquisition by
way of uti possidetis, including the States that emerged from Yugoslavia
in the latter decades of the twentieth century.418 Although the application of the concept is optional in resolving territorial disputes, it can
reduce conflict in many instances and, therefore, has been a popular
tool for the demarcation of the boundaries of newly-independent
States.419 Following World War II, the Western-Orthodox alliance assumed the power of disposition over the defeated regimes.420 They assumed this power to be valid, in fact, regardless of whether the defeated
State consented.421 An example of such a disposition was the SykesPicot Agreement of 1916, a secret agreement made between France
and Great Britain regarding the demarcation of territories in the Middle East.422 Russia made the secret pact public, but the League of Nations effectively mandated the agreement and imposed it upon the affected nations of the Middle East.423 Much of the territory eventually
fell under the Mandates system, and the Iran-Syria border is a remnant
of such decisions.424
The common result of the application of uti possidetis under the
Mandates and Trustee Systems was the creation of States based upon
geographic, rather than cultural, boundaries.425 These unnatural divisions have invited regional infighting in many regions of the world, particularly in Africa.426 The creation of the U.N. prompted the decolonization of many regions.427 Many of the colonies under the Mandates
and Trustee systems obtained rights of self-determination.428 Despite
the granting of such rights, many States are still an uneasy amalgam of
416 See id.
417 See Korman, supra note 12, at 235.
418 Brownlie, supra note 72, at 130.
419 See id.
420 See id.
421 See id.
422 See Korman, supra note 12, at 158.
423 See id. at 135–37, 158.
424 See id. at 160.
425 See Brownlie, supra note 72, at 129.
426 See id. at 163.
427 See id. at 164.
428 See id.
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ethnic, religious, or cultural groups.429 The following section addresses
these problems and explores how increased utilization of self-determination rights could assist in reducing ethnically based violence, as affected the Kurds in Iraq, Serbs and Bosnians in Yugoslavia, and other
peoples in an array of States. The following section also speculates as to
the effects of a broad recognition of numerous States in observance of
rights of self-determination, should such an eventuality come to pass.
C. Practical Limitations on Annexation Under Claims of Self-Defense
The primary practical restriction on acquisition under the doctrine of conquest under the U.N. Charter is the absence of an established adjudicative body with power to hear and resolve disputes involving conquered territory.430 If the U.N. allowed such acquisitions and
annexations, an international body would have to take responsibility for
determining whether the taking was just, and if so, how to conclude the
matter.431 To this author, such a body would necessarily have to be acceptable to all the parties involved. Currently, the U.N. simply provides
a framework for the resolution of such conflicts;432 however, it lacks the
power to abrogate and alter territorial boundaries.433
Another practical restriction is that under the U.N. Charter, it is
impossible to acquire territory through measures of self-defense.434 A
defending State has no justification for taking any of the territory of the
aggressor after it successfully repels an attack.435 Were it possible for
one State to acquire land from an aggressor State, it could discourage
States from invading other nations.436 If the international community
allowed such takings after a war, however, it would make “questions of
title depend upon the determination of such controversial issues as the
identification of the aggressor and the limits and meaning of selfdefense.”437
Finally, the Vienna Convention voids any treaty into which a State
enters under the threat of force.438 That is, quid pro quo annexation,
429 See James Mayall, Irredentist and Secessionist Challenges, in Nationalism 269, 276
( John Hutchinson & Anthony D. Smith eds., 1994).
430 See Korman, supra note 12, at 207.
431 Jennings, supra note 82, at 56.
432 See U.N. Charter art. 39.
433 Brownlie, supra note 72, at 163–64.
434 See U.N. Charter art. 51.
435 Korman, supra note 12, at 203–09.
436 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 421–23.
437 Korman, supra note 12, at 206.
438 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 52, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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in which “quid” is the victor’s agreement to sign a treaty to cease hostilities, constitutes duress and is consequently invalid because territorial
annexation between two parties at war lacks innate recognition by the
international community.439 Thus, any annexation resulting from selfdefense would almost certainly be formalized in an agreement to end
the war, and would therefore be void under the Vienna Convention.440
D. Self-Determination Under Modern International Law
The principle of self-determination441 allows a people to determine without coercion its preferred form of government.442 The concept has evolved through a number of stages and is still the subject of
much contention.443 The principle of self-determination was a key factor in the foundation of the United States.444 President Thomas Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence that “Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of
the governed.”445 Although not the first group to use the term “selfdetermination,” the Bolshevik revolutionaries who founded the Soviet
Union were the first to encompass within the term a view of national
equality wherein States have sovereign equality and the validity of a
claim for self-determination depends upon the oppression of the
claimant group.446 For Western European advocates of “self-determination” as a term encompassing government by popular consent, a transfer of territory between States is valid only with the consent of the people.447 Although President Wilson’s lofty views on self-determination,
which were specifically aimed at peoples outside the boundaries of
Western civilization, lacked international recognition immediately after
World War I, the international community has since begun recognizing
more human rights—certainly including, but likewise moving beyond,
the right of self-determination itself.448
439 See id. arts. 51–53.
440 See id. arts. 51–52.
441 See Zejnullah Gruda, Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova:
Uti Possidetis, the Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 353, 366–67,
370 (2005). International law defines a “people” generally as the inhabitants who reside
within a common political boundary. See id. at 367.
442 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 326.
443 See id. at 327.
444 See Gruda, supra note 441, at 370.
445 The Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
446 W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in International
Law 11–14 (Robert A. Nicholas ed., 1977).
447 See id. at 12.
448 Id. at 160–61.
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Following World War II, the right of self-determination continued to
evolve, starting with the U.N.’s Trustee System, modeled after the League
of Nations’ Mandates System, which placed certain territorial regions
under a Trust.449 The ICJ granted the Moroccan Sahara a right of selfdetermination in Western Sahara.450 Under the U.N.’s system, there were
three possible methods for former colonial peoples to determine their
form of government: (1) integration of the colony into an existing State,
(2) creation of a sovereign, independent State, or (3) any other condition or status that grows out of an uncoerced decision by the people.451
Initially, international law limited the principle of self-determination to newly decolonized States.452 Those States under the Mandates
or Trust Systems clearly had a right to self-determination in determining
their new governments.453 It is unclear, however, whether non-colonial
States have the same rights to self-determination.454 What is also unclear
is whether a colonial State may rely on the right to self-determination
anew after its initial reliance, as might occur if a different indigenous
group asserted independence from the post-colonial government.455
Although the re-utilization of self-determination in forming governments could become problematic, peoples within established States are
increasingly beginning to demand rights of self-determination.456
A major concern regarding the principle of self-determination as it
applies to non-colonial States is that it may conflict directly with certain
agreements among States regarding territorial integrity.457 It is often the
case that the principle of self-determination is manifest within the same
document that requires respect for territorial integrity.458 Several U.N.
resolutions recognize a right of self-determination to certain peoples.459
Despite the apparent contradictions in U.N. documents, the U.N.’s actions over the past few years seem to indicate an expansion of self449 Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 335.
450 Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, 175 I.C.J. 12, ¶¶ 62, 70 (Oct. 16).
451 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), supra note 390.
452 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 251–53.
453 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 327–28.
454 See id. at 329–33.
455 Id. at 335.
456 Mayall, supra note 429, at 274–76. Providing each “people” the right to establish
their own State, or even choose their own form of government could cause major concerns in the international community. Id. at 276. According to Professor James Mayall,
there may be as many as “8000 identifiably separate cultures.” Id.
457 See Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 332.
458 See id.
459 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2160 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2160XXI (Nov. 30, 1966); G.A.
Res. 1514, supra note 390; G.A. Res. 637 (VII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/637(VII) (Dec. 16, 1952).
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determination to peoples that inhabit lands beyond both the States and
colonies of Western civilization, or even those that have exercised their
right of self-determination independent of international influence.460
This expansion is apparent in the U.N. Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples.461 This document specifically expresses a right
of self-determination to indigenous societies.462 Although the U.N.
lacks the ability to convey title, mainly due to its lack of status as a territorial sovereign, and only possesses the power of recommendation, it
has been common for an international agency to dispose of Mandate
and Trustee territory through the collective action of States.463 According to Ian Brownlie, the right to terminate mandates may actually fall
within the U.N.’s powers.464 The ICJ has also spoken out on applying
the principle of self-determination to non-colonial territories.465 In a
1949 advisory opinion, the court stated that “‘[u]nder international
law, the Organization must be deemed to have those powers which,
though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.’”466 According to Brownlie, this confers upon the U.N. some implied right of territorial disposition under the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.467
E. Self-Determination and the Second Gulf War
The most recent war in Iraq provides fairly clear evidence of why
attempting to create rights of self-determination is a difficult proposition in reality. Although the original rationales given to justify the invasion of Iraq included the goal of giving the Iraqi people rights of selfdetermination, the United States also invaded for the purpose of establishing a friendly democratic government that would reject terror460 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 2627(XXV); U.N. Doc. A/RES/2627XXV (Oct. 24, 1970).
461 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295 ¶ 3, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
462 Id.
463 Brownlie, supra note 72, at 163–64.
464 See id. at 164. While there is some dispute over whether the U.N. should have the
capacity to do this (strictly speaking, the Allied powers that participated in the Treaty of
Versailles hold such power), the U.N. assumed the power to terminate the Mandate for
South West Africa in 1966. See id.
465 See id. at 657.
466 See id. (quoting Reparation, ICJ 1949 (1972), at 182).
467 Id. at 164. In the case of termination of mandates and trusteeships, Brownlie argues
that the U.N. may terminate them because the U.N. is not “conferring sovereignty;” rather,
the U.N. is simply deciding “on the manner in which the principle of self-determination
shall be implemented.” Id.
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ism.468 The goal of establishing democracy bears a close relationship to
that of supporting self-determination; it is often assumed that a free
people will select a democratic form of government, perhaps because it
is counterintuitive that a newly-freed people would reject freedom by
popular vote.469 Thus, in a very real sense, the invasion of Iraq sought
to permit self-determination.470
There are, however, many concerns attendant to “delivering” selfdetermination.471 There are practical concerns regarding the cost of
this enterprise, both from the perspective of the invading power, which
must bear the cost of invasion, and from that of the invaded country,
that is forced to suffer the inevitable collateral damage of even the most
advanced, targeted campaign.472 There are also theoretical concerns,
including whether any State has a unilateral right to invade another for
the purpose of establishing the conditions for self-determination.473 In
the case of Iraq, another rationale for the invasion was based on American claims of self-defense; the United States purportedly feared that al
Qaeda might find safe haven with the Iraqi regime of President Saddam Hussein and pose an intensified threat.474 The basis for this perception was the Iraqi leadership’s refusal to cooperate with U.N. weapons inspectors in their attempt to verify the status of Iraq’s arsenal of
chemical weapons that had previously been used both against the
Kurds in northern Iraq and against the Iranians in the Iran-Iraq war.475
The Iraqi regime’s flouting of the U.N.’s legitimate function seemed to
offer clear evidence to national intelligence agencies around the world

468 Fumbling the Moment, Economist, May 29, 2004, at 21.
469 Thomas M. Franck, United Nations Prospects for a New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. Int’l
L. & Pol. 601, 637 (1990).
470 See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Lays Out Goals for Iraq: Self-Rule and Stability, N.Y. Times,
May 24, 2004, at A1, A14.
471 See, e.g., Malanczuk, supra note 24, at 329.
472 Charles Tiefer, The Iraq Debacle: The Rise and Fall of Procurement-Aided Unilateralism as
a Paradigm of Foreign War, 29 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1, 11–12 (2007).
473 See Asli Ü. Bâli, Justice Under Occupation: Role of Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in
Iraq, 30 Yale J. Int’l L. 431, 439–40 (2005).
474 See Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and the
Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 447, 459–60 (2011).
475 See Christopher Clarke Posteraro, Intervention in Iraq: Towards a Doctrine of Anticipatory Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation Intervention, 15 Fla. J. Int’l L. 151, 157–58
(2002); David Wippman, Changing the Legal Regime: Using Force in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Beyond, 30 Cornell L. Forum 1, 5–6 (2003).
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that Iraq possessed a dangerous stockpile of chemical weapons—and,
hence, posed a danger to the United States.476
Thus, the U.S. invasion had as part of its justification the fear that
Iraq might ally with al Qaeda.477 According to U.S. officials, the activities of al Qaeda leaders in Baghdad reinforced the inference that Iraq
posted an imminent threat.478 This purported to reinforce a justification for invasion as necessary for self-defense under U.N. norms.479 The
problem with this argument was that, beyond the claims of Western
powers, there was at best ambiguous evidence of an Iraqi alliance with
al Qaeda.480 Moreover, even if Iraq did provide support to al Qaeda,
neither the U.N. Charter nor norms of international law recognize resource cooperation in and of itself as constituting an actual military
alliance.481 For this reason, the United States first sought authority from
the U.N. Security Council, based on the Iraqi regime’s obstruction of
the U.N.’s attempt to inspect its weapons facilities pursuant to the international agreements made after the first Gulf War.482 The Security
Council’s majority approbation suffered defeat after a veto threat,
which left the United States to decide whether to undertake unilateral
action.483
Having lost the opportunity to obtain formal international legitimation, the United States next turned to bilateral diplomacy to secure
international support outside the Security Council.484 In the author’s
view, this partially legitimated the invasion, by virtue of the participa476 See, e.g., Office of The Prime Minister, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The Assessment of the British Government, 2002, at 3 (U.K.), available at http://www.
archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/reps/iraq/cover.htm.
477 See Posteraro, supra note 475, at 165.
478 Interview with Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, in Washington, D.C. (Sept.
26, 2002), available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3669
(Department of Defense news briefing with Secretary Rumsfeld and General Pace).
479 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Legal Status of Iraq from 2003–2008, 11 Chi. J. Int’l L. 1, 4
(2010); Matthew L. Sandgren, War Redefined in the Wake of September 11: Were the Attacks
Against Iraq Justified?, 12 Mich. St. J. Int’l L. 1, 39–40 (2003).
480 See Kenneth Katzman, Cong. Research Serv., RL32217, Iraq and Al Qaeda: Allies or Not? 3–4 (2004), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/34715.
pdf.
481 See, e.g., Tess Bridgeman, The Law of Neutrality and the Conflict with Al Qaeda, 85
N.Y..U. L. Rev. 1186, 1210 (2010).
482 See Allen S. Weiner, The Use of Force and Contemporary Security Threats: Old Medicine for
New Ills?, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 415, 490–95 (2006).
483 Felicity Barringer, Eclipsed by Events, U.N. Officials Wonder About the Past and Ponder the
Future, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2003, at A21.
484 See Raymond W. Copson, Cong. Research Serv., RL 31715, Iraq War: Background
and Issues Overview 2–4 (2003).
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tion of a plurality of States; the effect was to relegate dissenting States to
unilateral objections, as they likewise lacked the power to secure official
U.N. condemnation, even in the form of a symbolic gesture in the U.N.
General Assembly. The result was active international support for the
U.S. invasion, which removed from the United States the burden of
showing an absolute justification based on a theory of self-defense.485
Specifically, the aggregation of international support justified the action under several theories, including that of the defense of the international community, and, more importantly, the fact that specific peoples within Iraq had long been deprived of their right of self-determination.486 This argument was particularly compelling in light of the Iraqi
regime’s ruthless suppression of both the Kurdish people in the north
and the Marsh Arabs in the south.487
Thus, the U.S. invasion of Iraq found support in the international
community based simultaneously on the justifications of quelling crossnation violence and supporting the rights of suppressed peoples to selfdetermination.488 The justification of establishing a right of selfdetermination for a people would have been insufficient.489 Likewise, it
would have been difficult to justify invasion based solely on the imminence of the threat of a resource alliance between Iraq and al Qaeda.490
The confluence of these two justifications, however, bolstered by Iraq’s
prior use of chemical weapons and evidence from national intelligence
agencies regarding Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapon technology, combined to enable the international community to support the U.S. invasion.491 Now the question is how specifically to establish meaningful
rights of self-determination.492
The challenge in Iraq is similar to that in Nigeria of former years,
wherein the boundaries of the former colony enclosed three inde485 See Ackerman, supra note 474, at 464.
486 See Ganesh Sitaraman, Counterinsurgency, the War on Terror, and the Laws of War, 95 Va.
L. Rev. 1745, 1800–02 (2009).
487 Cf. Roberta Cohen, Iraq’s Displaced: Where to Turn?, 24 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 301, 302
(2008) (discussing the facts that many Kurds and Marsh Arabs were already internally displaced in Iraq prior to the American invasion).
488 See Sitaraman, supra note 486, at 1800–02.
489 See supra text accompanying notes 486–488.
490 See id.
491 See Sitaraman, supra note 486, at 1800–03 (2009) (discussing the United Nations resolution that led to the American occupation of Iraq and the multiple potential justifications).
492 See, e.g., Youngjin Jung, In Pursuit of Reconstructing Iraq: Does Self-Determination Matter?, 33 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 391, 391–92, 405–08 (2005) (arguing that that United
States is a belligerent occupier and, as such, is bound to decide “how to incorporate the
principle of self-determination . . . into the context of . . . occupation”).

2012]

The Jurisprudence of Territorial Acquisition

51

pendently identifiable peoples within a single State.493 When the British
undertook to meet this particular challenge, they made the choice to
maintain the colonial boundaries, rather than to create a dangerous
precedent of redrawing settled boundaries for the sake of individual
people’s independence.494 The Organization of African Unity (today’s
African Union) likewise faithfully observed the principle of respecting
prior colonial boundaries in settling all disputes among post-colonial
African States.495 Similarly, in Iraq, it was particularly difficulty to define
the “Iraqi” people.496 Specifically, there were the ethnic divisions between Kurds, an Indo-European people related to the Iranians, and
Arabs, the dominant ethnicity,497 and religious divisions between Sunni
and Shi’a Muslims.498 Some measure of violence had characterized the
prior interactions among these three groups (Sunni Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Shi’a Arabs), but it was unclear how much of that was actually
a product of the defunct regime’s policies of violent oppression, without which perhaps there may not have been any significant conflict
among these groups.499
Throughout the occupation of Iraq, Western opinion-makers frequently insisted that peoples of disparate identities in the Islamic civilization were perpetually prone to violence against one another.500 That
this proposition conflicted with reality appeared not to dissuade many
from applying this stereotype to Iraq.501 There was, to be sure, a legitimate question of whether after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein the
493 See Larry R. Jackson, Nigeria: The Politics of the First Republic, 2 J. Black Stud. 277,
280–86 (1972); cf. Isaak I. Dore, Constitutionalism and the Post-Colonial State in Africa: A Rawlsian Approach, 41 St. Louis U. L.J. 1301, 1303–04 (1997) (discussing the situation in Nigeria). See generally U.S. State Dep’t, Background Note: Nigeria, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/2836.htm.
494 Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood, A Model Declaration on the Right of Secession, 11
N.Y. Int’l L. Rev. 1, 34 (1998).
495 See Charles E. Ehrlich, Ethnicity and Constitutional Reform: The Case of Ethiopia, 6 ILSA
J. Int’l & Comp. L. 51, 54 (1999).
496 See Harith Al-Qarawee, Redefining a Nation: The Conflict of Identity and Federalism in
Iraq, 2 Persp. On Federalism, no. 1, 2010, at 32, 34.
497 See generally Martin Van Bruinessen, The Debate on the Ethnic Identity of the Kurdish Alevis in Syncretistic Religious Communities in the Near East: Collected Papers of
the Symposium, Berlin 1995 (K. Kehl-Bodrogi, B. Kellner-Heinkee & A. Otter-Beaujean
eds. 1997) (describing the ethnic heritage of Kurdish peoples and how they differ from
their European and Middle Eastern neighbors).
498 See Bobby Ghosh, How to Tell Sunnis and Shi’ites Apart, Time, Mar. 5, 2007, at 30–31.
499 See id.
500 See, e.g., Pew Research Center, Muslim-Western Tensions Persist, July 21, 2011, http://
pewglobal.org/2011/07/21/muslim-western-tensions-persist/.
501 See, e.g., Edward D. Mansfield & Jack Snyder, Prone to Violence, Nat’l Int., Winter
2005–06, at 39, available at http://nationalinterest.org/article/prone-to-violence-596.
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former British Mandate of Iraq still possessed sufficient cultural coherence exist within pre-invasion borders. The only viable solution in Iraq,
however, given international precedent on the matter of dealing with
former colonies, was to keep the nation-state intact and allow the Iraqis
themselves to work out their own harmony.502
The tensions surrounding self-determination and its applicability
to any given State are ongoing and challenging. One major challenge is
that of simply developing a good definition of a people.503 A “people,”
may be defined by a number of factors, including religion, ethnicity,
culture, geography, and civilization of origin.504 And according to
James Mayall, there may be as many as “8000 identifiably separate cultures.”505 But it would be ludicrous to argue that boundaries should be
drawn so as to isolate distinctly similar groups of people. The potentially huge number of States that would result is less concerning than
the dangerous precedent of associating national boundaries with the
territorial reaches of nominally distinct peoples. Such a position would
incentivize surreptitious occupation and result in innumerable conflicts
that the international community—now fragmented into an exponentially larger number of States—would be incapable of moderating. An
example of an error of judicial judgment that indeed moved in this direction is Western Sahara, which incentivized foreign occupation for the
sole purpose of securing international legitimacy for a new State based
on an observation that it appeared to contain its own people.506 In fact,
the Moroccan Sahara constituted such a sparsely populated region,
more than any other proposed State except Greenland, that populating
it with a foreign people was a comparatively easy proposition.507 Consequently, any precedent of permitting the definition of national
boundaries to follow the territory claimed by a nominally distinct people is dangerous.508
With regard to modern doctrines for justifying the acquisition of
territory, self-determination raises additional problems. For the principle
502 See Cohen, supra note 487, at 335.
503 Gruda, supra note 441, at 366–68.
504 Id.
505 Mayall, supra note 429, at 276.
506 See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶¶ 81, 151, 162.
507 See id. ¶ 92; World Population Prospects, U.N. Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs (Oct.
22, 2010), http://esa.un.org/wpp/Sorting-Tables/tab-sorting_population.htm; Greenland,
in Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook (2011), available at https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gl.html/.
508 See Alexander Martinenko, The Right of Secession as a Human Right, 3 Ann. Surv.
Int’l & Comp. L. 19, 23–24 (1996).
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of self-determination to work, the people must be able to effectuate an
actual transfer of title to the new sovereign.509 It is insufficient for a people simply to declare that, via self-determination, they now have title to
the territory.510 There must be some formal method of transitioning sovereigns if self-determination is to be viable.511 The only effective doctrine
for obtaining possession and transferring title appears to be cession.512
The doctrine of occupation is problematic because the land would be
unlikely to be considered terra nullius;513 the doctrine of conquest is no
longer acceptable to the international community which obviates this
doctrine as a justification;514 and, the doctrine of prescription would require the acquiescence of the exiting sovereign, which is unlikely to occur in most cases.515 Thus, only the doctrine of cession remains.
F. Negotiation and Arbitration of Territorial Disputes
As traditional modes of acquisition become obsolete or scorned by
the international community, and as their modern replacements seem
to offer more problems than they solve, many States turn to negotiations or arbitrations to resolve disputes.516 One forum for these methods of dispute resolution, the PCIJ, was founded by the League of Nations under Article 14 of the Charter.517 The ICJ constitutes the
successor to the PCIJ under the U.N.518 When establishing which party
has title to the territory, the ICJ usually bases its decisions on treaties,
the doctrine of uti possidetis, and effective control.519 The ICJ focuses
primarily on legal documents when rendering decisions.520
509 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 78–79.
510 See id.
511 Cf. Martinenko, supra note 508, at 23–24.
512 Cf. Jennings, supra note 82, at 16 (stating that while all other methods of title acquisition are unilateral, cession is a bilateral mode of acquisition that requires the cooperation of both parties).
513 See Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. ¶ 80.
514 See Korman, supra note 12, at 209–10.
515 See Jennings, supra note 82, at 39.
516 See Anna Spain, Integration Matters: Rethinking the Architecture of International Dispute Resolution, 32 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. 1, 5–6 (2010).Arbitration facilities are available at The Hague,
and several countries use them. See Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International Law: A Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 Cardozo J. Conflict Resol. 159, 197–98
(2006); About Us, Permanent Court of Arbitration, http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.
asp?pag_id=1027 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
517 See League of Nations Charter art. 14.
518 History, International Court of Justice, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.
php?p1=1&p2=1 (last visited Jan. 10, 2012).
519 Brian Taylor Sumner, Territorial Disputes at the International Court of Justice, 53 Duke
L.J. 1779, 1803–04 (2004).
520 See id. at 1805–06.
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In a dispute between Botswana and Namibia, the ICJ looked to the
Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890 to determine the legal status of,
and boundary around, Kasikili/Sedudu Island.521 The treaty had established spheres of influence between England and Germany.522 Despite
various sources of evidence of Namibian prescriptive title, including
maps and other written evidence, the ICJ held that, by the terms of the
Anglo-German Treaty, the island belonged to Botswana.523 Similarly, in
Land and Maritime Boundary Between Cameroon and Nigeria, the ICJ rejected Nigeria’s claim for consolidation of title and stated that effective
control was insufficient to override conventional title.524 The ICJ ruled
that the principle of uti possidetis determined title under the AngloGerman Agreement of 11 March 1913.525
In some cases, however, title cannot be determined from binding
agreements.526 In these situations, the court will look to whether a party
has exercised effective control.527 In Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and
Pulau Sipadan, the ICJ examined a number of documents but was unable to find any that established title.528 The court next looked to effective possession evidence and found that the island territories belonged
to Malaysia based on current national legislation, pronouncements
within administrative law, and quasi-judicial opinions.529 Although such
evidence was relatively scarce, it covered a significant period of time
and displayed a pattern manifesting Malaysia’s persistent intention to
exercise political functions on the islands.530 In reaching its determination, the ICJ noted that it will only weigh evidence of effective possession when it is otherwise infeasible to establish clear title.531
Surveying the types of evidence used most frequently, one scholar
determined that parties in international arbitrations over territory
521 Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. 1045, ¶ 93 (Dec. 13).
522 Anglo-German Treaty of July 1, 1890, in 51 Das Staatsarchiv: Sammlung der Offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart [The State Archive: Collection of Official Documents Relating to Contemporary History] at 151 (Adam
Blauhut trans., 1891).
523 Kasikili/Sedudu Island, 1999 I.C.J. ¶¶ 82, 90, 94, 104.
524 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, 1998 I.C.J. 275, ¶ 106 ( June 11).
525 Id. ¶¶ 52, 60.
526 See, e.g., Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indon./Malay.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. 625, ¶¶ 91–93 (Dec. 17).
527 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 92, 124.
528 See id. ¶ 143.
529 See id. ¶¶ 134–49.
530 See id. ¶ 148; Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 55.
531 Lesaffer, supra note 94, at 54.
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brought a variety of reinforcing arguments.532 Litigants frequently put
forth arguments based on geography, economy, culture, heritage, elitism, and ideology as evidence for their respective claims.533 Such evidence, however, was rarely persuasive if raised in lieu of treaties or other
“hard” documents.534 The reason is that most of the disputes feature an
array of conflicting arguments by both sides, but these arguments often
rest on sparse evidence.535 Therefore, looking to treaties, agreements,
and other “hard” evidence more readily enables the court to achieve
sufficient clarity and certainty to support a confident ruling.536
Conclusion and the Future
Modes of acquisition have taken many forms since the dawn of civilizations, from rudimentary systems in which the most powerful actor
might take what it could, to a modern, individual rights-based approach
based on the collective experiences of Western civilization during the
era of hegemonic expansion. Throughout the twentieth century, there
were persistent attempts to eradicate the traditional doctrine of conquest and establish a system of peaceful transfer that recognizes the
rights of people in addition to those of the State. The most prominent
feature of this evolution was the establishment of international organizations to advocate peace and to protect the human rights of individuals.
Unfortunately, these institutions, and the modern modes of peaceful
acquisition they advocate, have proven inadequate. Even the strongest
forms of condemnation from the international community have been
unable to prevent the use of condemned practices to claim territory.
Part of the reason the modern modes of acquisition have failed to
take control is perhaps their logical flaws. The concept of self-determination—namely, that every people should enjoy the right to consent to
the form of government that will rule them—is limited in the extent to
which it can be applied to every society on every continent. However,
the practical limits to this principle, such as the prospect of 8000 separate States in the world, are obvious. Beyond this, the burden of determining what exactly constitutes a “people” for purposes of establishing
a country under the doctrine of self-determination would clog and
532 See Sumner, supra note 519, at 1784–92.
533 See id.
534 See id. at 1806–07.
535 See id. at 1783–92 (describing potential disputes when litigating based on geographical, economic, cultural, elitist, and ideological justifications).
536 Cf. id. at 1809 (arguing that the ICJ’s preference for treaty law might be an attempt
to restore predictability and stability in international territorial disputes).

56

Boston College International & Comparative Law Review

[Vol. 35:1

cripple the international legal system. Moreover, the precedent of
granting independent States to often ill-defined independent peoples
would undermine the integrity of national boundaries; it would not
relax any tensions that might currently exist between groups. By now, it
should go without saying providing a people a right of self-determination is not as simple as signing a declaration and then standing back to
watch the birth of a new State.
The recent conflict in Iraq provides clear evidence that vindicating
the right of self-determination takes huge amounts of time, treasure,
and blood. The current Iraqi government may finally be the product of
its people, but the role of the United States and its allies has been essential to its stability, and will be for the foreseeable future. In other
scenarios, it is possible that similar efforts might fall short of the ideal
outcome that appears to be the Iraqi experience of the twenty-first century. There remains no definition of what a “people” means in Iraq, but
that question has waned in importance as Iraq’s multiple peoples appear to have settled into some semblance of harmonious coexistence.
While the nation still suffers from conflicts among cultures and religions, these conflicts are now less violent than they were in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. invasion.
More generally, recent experience has provoked questions of
whether it is just to go to war in order to effectuate self-determination.
Under what conditions is it valid for foreign powers to invade, regardless of the virtuous ends that they espouse to justify their campaign? In
the case of the Iraqi invasion, for example, the U.N. officially declined
to back it, so the international community acted outside of that structure to pursue what it collectively felt to be a worthwhile goal. This was
an unprecedented act in the history of international relations, and it is
unclear where that response may lead in the future of the U.N. or even
the definition of the international community itself.
Perhaps the best way to confront the concerns that attend the acquisition of territory today is to utilize all available modes of acquisition in
moderation. Rather than attempt to rely on the principle of selfdetermination as a spearhead for the reduction of conflict, the international community must develop a system for ascertaining the best mode
of acquisition for each case. Moreover, in order to effectuate such a system, the international community, whether via the U.N. or some other
body—including the unsettling possibility of further ad hoc, bilaterallyarranged international coalitions similar to that which supported the
Iraq invasion—must be so organized as to wield collective authority in
State relations. Since World War II, the modern system of imposing sanctions and issuing strongly worded resolutions has been widely used to
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punish aggression. But that combination of remedies often seems more
like a pro forma exercise in diplomacy than an effective means of effect
needed change. Although such a system has worked in some situations,
the international community is frequently helpless to stop aggression
and acquisitions that result from centuries of cultural incompatibility.
Future domains of territorial acquisitions include space and the
ocean floor. The 1960’s race to the Moon served as the catalyst for the
development of an international framework to determine nation-states’
rights in space. In 1967, the U.N. reached a resolution in the matter by
passing the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies.537 Although its primary purpose concerned the
banning of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, the resolution provided a foundation to preserve space exploration for the good
of all mankind, not for the advantage of individual nation-states.538
Principles of territorial acquisition may be necessary to resolve
near-space disputes as well. International telecommunication networks
rely on geosynchronous orbiting satellites.539 The International Telecommunications Union, through INTELSAT, developed a system to
allocate geosynchronous space and maintain satellite resources.540 Nevertheless, non-member States predictably dispute the characterization
of geosynchronous allocations as outer-space. For example, in 1976, the
Bogota Declaration announced that “segments of the synchronous geostationary orbit are an integral part of the territory over which the
equatorial States exercise their national sovereignty.”541
To prevent rogue States from using force and relying on the doctrine of conquest to take territory, the international community must
prepare to utilize sufficient force to subdue such uprisings. Beyond
stopping aggression, however, the international community must also
have some method for creating a system that will permit or induce rival
cultures to live harmoniously. What is most interesting about the mode
537 See generally G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI)/21 U.N. Doc. A/RES/2222(XXI) (Dec. 19, 1966);
G.A. Res. 1721 (XXI)/16 U.N. Doc. A/RES/1721(XVI) (Dec. 20, 1961).
538 See Shaw, supra note 15, at 545.
539 See id. at 549–52. Geosynchronous orbits occur approximately 22,300 miles above
the equatorial line and allow satellites to remain fixed in relation to the Earth’s surface. See
id. at 552.
540 See id. at 549. Shaw notes that the communists established a comparable system
called INTER-SPUTNIK. Id.
541 Bogota Declaration (Dec. 7, 1976), in 6 J. Space L. 193, 193 (1978). Signatories to
the Bogota Declaration include Brazil, Columbia, the Congo, Ecuador, Indonesia, Kenya,
Uganda, and Zaire. Id. at 196.
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of reaction to the second Gulf War is the prospect that multiple modes
of international cooperation, characterized by a combination of fixed
associations of nations and ad hoc coalitions, may become this century’s norm. Despite the uneasiness that this prospect will evoke in
many quarters, it is possible that a competing system of cooperation,
exemplified by the dissensus between the U.N. Security Council and
the free coalition of States that backed the Iraq invasion, is superior to a
fixed system that is the sole authority for international relations.
Although almost everyone can agree that wars and rogue States are
undesirable, if the age-old status quo must suffer destruction, the international community must put into place an effective, realistic plan to end
the justification for acquisition by way of the doctrine of conquest to dissuade rogue coalitions of States that might use conquest as a justification
for territorial expansion. Meanwhile, it should review its current organizational premises, as the dissensus between the U.N. Security Council
and the ad hoc coalition in the Iraq case indicates that the current structure impedes true international consensus about how to handle the
modern international emergencies. Calls to vest more power in the U.N.
suffer from the misguided assumption that the optimal way to police the
world is by delegating more national sovereignty to a collectivity. In fact,
the international scale of conflict is analogous to the national scale of a
major economy. Centralized control works in a corporation, but a country, let alone an international union, requires a wiser, more refined balancing of competing interests. Equilibrium can only result from multiple
States pursuing self-interested ends in cooperation with all other States.
In the end, the system must be arranged so that it would be against the
interests of every State to flout international consensus. Insofar as all
States come to depend on all others to meet their needs, and no State
remains that relies on the vicissitudes of a sole human decision-maker on
the matter of international relations, flexibility will breed peace.

